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Scientific Testing and Proof of Paternity:. Some Controversy
and Key Issues for Family Law Counsel
Christopher L. Blakesley'
I. INTRODUCTION
Blood and tissue testing, especially DNA matching, have become important
elements of both criminal and paternity or maternity litigation. Such scientific
testing has become so important that it has taken on aspects that may cause it to
benefit or to do harm to the judicial process or to any given case. This article
focuses on the value and the dangers surrounding this interesting subject.
A. Blood and Tissue Testing
The 1995 Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Pace v. State reemphasized the
importance of DNA testing generally and the significance of blood and tissue
genetic testing used to exclude patemity.' The advances in and importance of
genetic testing have been recognized and supported by courts across the nation. For
example, Ohio courts have taken judicial notice of the accuracy of DNA testing.'
The court noted that an illegitimate child may prove paternity by genetic testing and
allowed the alleged father to be disinterred to conduct the test. The court stated that
"the accuracy and infallibility of the DNA test are nothing short of remarkable,"
and proclaimed that the proof problems which had plagued paternity cases should
no longer deprive an illegitimate child of the opportunity to prove paternity.3
In 1991, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in In re J.M,' also noted that ". . . the
modem status [of blood grouping tests in paternity cases] has been described by
one commentator as follows: 'As far as accuracy, reliability, dependability-even
infallibility-of the test are concerned, there is no longer any controversy. The
result of the test is universally accepted by distinguished scientific and medical
authority.... [T]here is now ... practically universal and unanimous judicial
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
J.Y. Sanders Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. This article is
adapted from and is significantly expanded beyond Chapter 6 of the author's book, Louisiana Family
Law (Michie 1992 and 1996 update).
1. Pace v. State, 648 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1995).
2. Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310 (P. Ct. Franklin County 1988).
3. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1314 (emphasis added). See also Batcheldor v. Boyd, 423 S.E.2d
810 (N.C. Ct App. 1992); In re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749 (Pa. 1991). The tendency of
experts to claim testing infallability is one of the serious problems facing the judiciary. First, it is
not true. Second, it is claimed often. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990) ("[lit is
technically impossible to make a false/positive identification." (transcript at 677)); Kelly v. State, 792
S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App. 1990) ("There is no way to get a false positive with this technology."
(transcript at 919)). See cases cited and quoted by Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in
the Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 Jurimetrics J. 21, 23 and nn.4-7 (1993).
4. In re J.M., 590 So. 2d 565, 567 (La. 1991).
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willingness to give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test
exclusion ofpaternity."' 5
This statement may be true to the limited extent that the testing procedure in
that case was completed correctly; blood or tissue testing always depends on the
quality of the testers and of the testing procedures. Also, the court's comment
relates only to exclusion of paternity. When the testing is used to "prove
paternity," it relies on statistical probability. This, clearly, is more problematical.
The accuracy of the "scientific" claim obviously depends not only on the quality
of the evidence and the quality of its collection and treatment during storage and
testing, but also on the quality of the statistical evidence and the capacity of the
presenter of that evidence to allow the trier of fact to understand its actual validity
and appropriate impact.
B. New Federal Law
The federal government amended, on August 22, 1996,42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)
to require states to provide for and to insist upon genetic testing in contested
paternity cases.' The child and all other parties, unless specifically excepted out
(or otherwise barred by state law), are required to submit to genetic testing upon the
request of any party.7 The requesting party must support her request with "a sworn
statement alleging paternity, and setting forth facts establishing a reasonable
possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties; or ... denying
paternity, and setting forth facts establishing a reasonable possibility of the
nonexistence of sexual contact between the parties." 8 The statute also calls for
admissibility of genetic testing results if the test is "of a type generally acknowl-
edged as reliable by accreditation bodies designated by the Secretary; and ...
performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body. . ."' An
objection to the admissibility of genetic test results must be made in writing no later
than a specified number of days before any hearing at which the results may be
introduced into evidence, or, at the option of the state, no later than a specified
number of days after receipt of the results."0 The genetic test results are "admissi-
5. Id. (quoting Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 7, 101 S. Ct. 2202, 2206 (1980) (quoting Sidney
B. Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings § 9.13 (1975))) (emphasis added). See also State Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Jones, 638 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994) (DNA indication of "99.49%"
insufficient without other evidence supporting paternity); compare County of El Dorado, 38 Cal. Rptr.
2d 908 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (where paternity index is high enough, alleged father admitted having
sexual intercourse with the mother at the relevant time, and produced no countervailing evidence, the
presumption of paternity is not rebutted). The opposite result obtains in California without
corroborating evidence. Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
6. Personal Responsibillty and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 2105,
104th Cong., 2d Session, August 22, 1996, amending 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5).
7. Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(B)(i).
8. Id. The law also calls for specific voluntary acknowledgment mechanisms and services.
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(F).
10. Id.
[Vol. 57
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
ble as evidence of paternity without the need for foundation testimony or other
proof of authenticity or accuracy, unless objection is made.""
The new federal statute also "allows" a state to establish a rebuttable or even
a conclusive presumption of paternity upon genetic testing results which indicate
a "threshold probability that the alleged father is the father of the child."' 2 This
provision is not only a misstatement of the nature of the testing results available,
but it may be unconstitutional when considered along with other parts of the law.
These difficulties are a major focus of this article. Other provisions have problems
as well. The appropriate paternity decision may be rendered by a judicial or even
by an administrative body if it is shown "by clear and convincing evidence of
paternity (on the basis of genetic tests or other evidence)." 3 Like in other
Louisiana family law matters, a problem is not created if a party has no right to a
jury trial.'
The new federal law and the laws in many states, including Louisiana, are
misleading as to the values they pretend to represent and risk doing as much harm
as good. The tendency to be overwhelmed, or overenamored, with scientific
testing, because it may be a boon to establishing paternity, and therefore to
protecting children and parental interests as well, risks causing harm. Harm can
result when overzealousness in a good cause overcomes caution and legal common
sense. Science may become a talisman and a false-god, wreaking havoc and harm,
if judges are not vigilant in ensuring that the application of the test and the
admission of the testing results are done in a manner to assure accuracy and
understanding rather than mere incantation. This article, while recognizing the
value and interest in utilizing valuable new tools, suggests caution and the need to
address the above-noted tendencies.
C. Some Tests Not Sufficient-Low Sperm Count
Scientists or doctors who conduct tests to determine a low sperm count are not
"experts" in dispute per Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397. Louisiana Revised
Statues 9:397 only contemplates qualified examiners of blood samples, not those
who claim impotence or testify as to low sperm count.'
D. The Purpose of Blood and Tissue Analysis
A major use of blood or tissue analysis is either to exclude the possibility of
paternity of an alleged father or, if he is not excluded by the evidence, "to calculate
the odds that the defendant would have passed the disclosed genetic markers to a
particular child." 6 Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently approved of and
11. Id.
12. Id. at (G).
13. Id. at (J).
14. Id. at (1).
15. State v. Bolden, 519 So. 2d 362, 365 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
16. Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472, 475 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); State v. Givens, 616 So. 2d
1997]
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supported scientific testing to exclude individuals from being considered the father
of a child, holding it to be reliable and accurate." As noted in the legislative
history of the Federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments, increasingly
sophisticated tests for genetic markers permit the exclusion of over 99% of those
who may be accused of paternity." Such precision may be available even after
the putative father is deceased because DNA testing uses molecules that often
remain stable and testable long after death.' 9 The advent of DNA and related
testing portends higher accuracy in actually provingpaternity. In fact, since its first
reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to "general acceptance in
less than a decade."" This article considers both traditional blood testing and
DNA matching for purposes of proving paternity.
DNA testing also allows proof of paternity either posthumously or while the
father is alive."' The Louisiana Supreme Court articulated the rationale for
allowing posthumous proof of paternity in Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir,2
where plaintiff brought a filiation action in order to establish her relationship to the
decedent during the course of a succession proceeding. Relying on existing civil
discovery rules, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that collateral parties could be
ordered to submit to a blood test for DNA comparison purposes.23 This, of
course, raises privacy and other constitutional issues.
E. The Constitutionality of Blood and Tissue Testing. The Impact of
Substantive Due Process-Privacy, Search and Seizure
Blood and tissue testing must meet substantive and procedural due process
standards. As a general rule, the law ought to protect the interests of individuals in
having their genetic information kept private. The new testing technologies pose
serious risks to freedom and privacy. They risk increasing the power that a very
few people will hold over many. 4
259, 261 (La. App. 2d Cit. 1993); State v. Stringer, 567 So. 2d 758, 762-63 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
17. Pace v. State, 648 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1995); In re J.M., 590 So. 2d 565 (La. 1991) (citing
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985), and other authority).
18. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1916 (1988).
19. Charles N. LeRay, Implications of DNA Technology on Posthumous Paternity Determina-
tion: Deciding the Facts When Daddy Can't Give His Opinion, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 747 (1994). See
Pace, 648 So. 2d at 1302 (citing e.g., Tipps v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.
Tex. 1991) and In re Estate of Rogers, 583 A.2d 782 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)).
20. Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in A Post-Daubert World, 84 Geo.
L.J. 1985, 2009 (1996). DNA profiling is commonly used to prove paternity. E.g., State v. Simien,
677 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Meehan, 461 S.E.2d 369, 370 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995); cf State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bradley, 673 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996).
21. See Pace, 648 So. 2d at 1302 (citing e.g., Tipps v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp.
577 (S.D. Tex. 1991) and In re Estate of Rogers, 583 A.2d 782 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990));
In re J.M., 590 So. 2d 565, 567 (La. 1991).
22. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474 (La. 1991).
23. Pace, 648 So. 2d at 1302.
24. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 421,
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In 1991, the Louisiana Supreme Court in In re J.M.,2 recognized the need for
constitutional protection when it upheld the constitutionality of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:396. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 authorizes court-ordered blood
testing of a child, the child's mother and the alleged father to prove paternity. The
court held that "although, [an] alleged father has a right to privacy and to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, those rights are not absolute and may be
reasonably regulated when the state has a sufficiently weighty interest." 6 It also
held that blood and tissue testing is a search and seizure. The significant state
interest in the welfare of children and the conservation of public assistance funds,
however, justifies the intrusion. The compelling interest stems from the pervasive
concern for the welfare of children."
The court applied the balancing test articulated in the United States Supreme
Court decision of Matthews v. Eldridge" to determine what procedures are
constitutionally required to protect the alleged father's rights. The defendant's
privacy interests were balanced against the state's compelling interest in protecting
its children. The court also factored in the risk of arriving at an erroneous
determination under the circumstances because such a determination could
seriously impact upon the a father's significant interests.29 In balancing the
alleged father's privacy and liberty interests, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated,
"[a] blood test is minimally intrusive, relatively painless, and medically safe. In
facilitating a determination of paternity, blood tests are highly reliable and
unequaled in evidentiary value....
1. Procedural Due Process
In addition, the In re J.M court held that although the statute does not
explicitly require it, procedural due process requires that the party alleging paternity
make a preliminary showing that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. It
is clear "that an individual's constitutional right to due process is implicated when
compulsory blood testing is ordered by a court."3' Sufficient procedural safe-
guards to afford due process must, therefore, be provided.
2. Various State Statutory Protections
In addition to the constitutional protections, a number of states since 1995
have passed laws limiting the accessibility and use of genetic information
422 (1996) (considering the benefits and dangers of the "genome project").
25. 590 So. 2d 565 (La. 1991).
26. Id. at 568 (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985)).
27. 590 So. 2d at 568; La. R.S. 46:236.1 (1982 and Supp. 1996); see Kay v. White, 286 F.
Supp. 684, 687 (E.D. La. 1968).
28. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
29. In re J.M., 590 So. 2d 565 (La. 1991).
30. Id. at 567.
31. Id. at 569 (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408 (1957)).
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because of the serious potential for abuse and the significant risks to privacy and
liberty interests.32 These new laws generally prohibit obtaining genetic
information from an individual and taking an individual's tissue sample for DNA
testing purposes without first obtaining informed consent." These protections
have exceptions, however.
Exceptions to this general rule of privacy include: identification of a
deceased person, where governmental entities are so authorized by specific law
(e.g., for criminal investigations); screening newborns; anonymous research; and,
key to the purposes of this article, establishment of paternity.34 In such cases,
consent may not be necessary.
F. Scientific Testing Is Constitutional and Impressive, but No Panacea
DNA identification evidence is and should be a powerful tool in identifying
parents and children.3 The laboratory reported match may be highly suggestive
of a true match, but it is not the same as a true match.36 Although DNA testing
is used to help establish that individuals have been wrongly convicted, Barry
Scheck and Peter Neufeld showed in the O.J. Simpson trial, as they and others
have done elsewhere, that it is a two-edged sword. They established how
vulnerable such testing may be and ought to be, if not carried out correctly.
Questions and challenges to the testing are appropriate because there is little peer
scrutiny due to the small forensic scientific community.37 We will consider the
areas of vulnerability and related problems with the testing process.
G. Some Miscellaneous, Related Information
If a child is illegitimate under Civil Code article 180 and the natural father
is known by the mother, she shall complete and sign a "paternity information
form," issued by the Vital Records Registry. This form shall include: the child's
32. E.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 659.700-720 (Supp. 1996) (effective July 19, 1995). See generally
Michael M. J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Material: Stepping into the
Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 Am. J. L. & Med. 109 (1996); cf. State v. Simien, 677 So.
2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
33. E.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.710(1) (Supp. 1996).
34. Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.7 10(l)(a)-(e) (Supp. 1996). See Sudwischer v. Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d
474 (La. 1991) (child has right to prove paternity of deceased father-using DNA testing of
legitimate daughter); J.E. Cullens, Jr., Note, Should the Legitimate Child be Forced to Pay for the
Sins of Her Father?: Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoflpauir, 53 La. L. Rev. 1675 (1993); John Devlin,
Review of Recent Developments: 1992-93, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 54 La. L. Rev. 683 (1994);
Katherine S. Spaht & Kenneth Rigby, Louisiana's New Divorce Legislation: Background and
Commentary, 54 La. L. Rev. 19 (1993). See also Matthew Goldstein, Posthumous Use of Blood Tests
Allowed, 215 N.Y. L.J. I (col. 3) (Apr. 12, 1996).
35. Cf Koehler, supra note 3.
36. Id.
37. Kesan, supra note 20.
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name; date of birth; alleged father's full name; his mailing address; his street
address or the location where he may be found; his date of birth; and the name
of his parent or guardian if he is a minor. It also includes his city and state of
birth, his social security number, and his place of employment. Within fifteen
days after the date of admission (of the mother or the birth?) the hospital
"birthing facility" shall forward the form to support enforcement services, office
of family support, Department of Social Services. If the birth occurred in a
place other than a licensed hospital or birthing facility, the form shall be
completed at the time the home birth is recorded in the Vital Records Registry
and will be submitted to support enforcement services fifteen days thereafter.
If the father has not acknowledged the child, the mother shall sign as informant.
If she is incapable, her representative shall sign for her.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:34(E) requires the Department of Social
Services to serve the alleged father (or his tutor/guardian if he is a minor) with
notice that he has been named as father on the form. Notice shall include the
name of the child and the name of the mother. It shall advise the alleged father
of the allegation and how it may be contested. It shall also advise him that he
can request that blood tests be conducted. It also is to indicate that he can sign
an acknowledgment. Upon receipt of notice, the father has ninety days to contest
the allegation. This is done by advising the Department in writing that he is not
the father.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:34(E)(3), (6), (7) provides that if the alleged
father fails to contest the allegation in writing within ninety days, he shall be
presumed to be the father of the child, 'for support purposes only." The agency
seeking support or custodial parent can use this presumption to obtain a support
order. If the alleged father contests paternity, a hearing is to be held and blood
tests may be ordered. If the "results of the blood tests indicate by a probability
of 99.9% or higher that the alleged father is in fact the father of the child, or if
the alleged parent fails to appear for the court-ordered blood tests, the court shall
rule that he is the father of the child, for purposes of support only, and shall
issue an order for support." The father must pay all costs if he is found to be
the father; otherwise, the party making the allegations must pay.
These laws pose some potential constitutional and scientific/legal problems:
Blood tests (or even DNA tests) do not really establish that there is a certain
percentage chance that the tested individual is the father. As noted infra, there
are problems with the theory behind the genetic population groupings and, even
more significantly, in the testing procedures. There are so many places where
the testers, those who ship, store, and report the testing results, may contaminate
or otherwise cause a false positive, that it is misleading (indeed incorrect) to state
in the statute that blood tests may "indicate by a probability of 99.9% or higher
that he is in fact the father."' "
38. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law Ch. 6 (Michie 1992 and 1996 update).
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H. Standard of Proof in Establishing Paternity
Louisiana Civil Code article 209 (A) has long provided that proof of
paternity by a preponderance of the evidence is required when the alleged parent
is alive." In Louisiana, proof by a preponderance of the evidence means that,
taking the evidence as a whole, the proof adduced shows that the fact or cause
sought to be established is more probable than not.' In 1987, the United States
Supreme Court, in Rivira v. Minnich,4' affirmed the constitutionality of applying
the preponderance standard to establish paternity. Louisiana Civil Code article
209 (B) calls for proof by clear and convincing evidence when the alleged father
is deceased. 2
L New Medical Evidence on the Time of Conception
A new scientific development impacts and emphasizes the need for
corroboration. Recent scientific studies establish that 65% of all pregnancies are
conceived on either the day of ovulation or on the preceding day and that an
additional 11% are conceived two days before ovulation. Relatively few children
are conceived from intercourse more than six days before ovulation or at any
time after ovulation.3
II. THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF BLOOD AND TISSUE TESTING
A. The Paternity Index
With the combination of tests, the expert may often state confidently, in an
appropriate case, that the probabilities are between 97% to 99.95% that a given
man is the father of the child in question." For example, where "the scientific
evidence showed a paternity index of 1359 to 1, and a 99.93 percent probability
of paternity . . .," courts often find this to be "very strong evidence" that the
named defendant is actually the father.145
39. La. Civ. Code art. 209(A); McKenzie v. Thomas, 678 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996);
State v. Guichard, 655 So. 2d 1371, 1379 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 660 So. 2d 454 (1995);
Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472, 474 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
40. La. Civ. Code art. 209(A); Guichard, 655 So. 2d at 1379.
41. 483 U.S. 574, 107 S. Ct. 3001 (1987).
42. See also, e.g., Bilbrey v. Smithers, 1996 WL 494990 (Tenn. Sept. 3, 1996) (Tennessee
requires clear and convincing evidence after alleged father's death-and paternity must be established
before property of the deceased father vests in persons other than the claimant).
43. Joe Leigh Simpson, Pregnancy and the timing of Intercourse, 333 New Eng. J. Med. 1563
(1995); Allan J. Wilcox et al., Timing of Sexual Intercourse in Relation to Ovulation; Effects on the
Probability of Conception, Survival of the Pregnancy, and the Sex of the Baby, 333 New. Eng. J.
Med. 1517 (1995); see also Ira M. Ellman et al., Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 37 (update to
2d ed., 1996).
44. See Blakesley, supra note 38, and authority cited therein.
45. Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472, 475 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) (but the scientific evidence
was corroborated by the trial judge's "recogniz[ing] a strong physical resemblance between defendant
and the child .... " and significant relationship and corroborative factors were present).
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B. The Bayes Theorum
The "paternity index" is determined by applying the Bayes Theorum, a
theorurn developed by an Eighteenth Century Presbyterian minister in England.
It is designed to help calculate the impact of evidence "respecting the occurrence
of a questioned event upon the prior probability that the event occurred."'  The
Theorum may be expressed in several forms. The simplest may be:
Odds (X/E) = P (E/X) x Odds (X)
P (E/not-X)
In narrative form, this means that "the odds of an unknown fact, here
paternity, given that we have new evidence, (E), is equal to the ratio between the
probability that the new evidence is true and the probability that it is not true,
multiplied by the prior assessment of the probability of that unknown fact."'"
Testimony regarding the Bayes Theorem may be misleading if the expert does
not make it clear that: (1) he or she has made an assumption about the prior
probability; and (2) the jury is free to second guess the estimate of the prior
probability. If the witness does not make that clear, the witness may effectively
usurp the jury's authority."
C. What Exactly Is the "Paternity Index?"
The paternity index has been described as "the probability that a cross
between the defendant and the mother would produce an offspring with the
child's phenotypes and the corresponding probability for a random selection of
genes from the male population."' 9 In other words, as explained by Professors
Clark and Glowinsky:
For paternity testing purposes the apparent complications of this
theorem may be simplified. The first step in the process is to determine
the prior odds that the defendant is the child's father. The prevailing
convention among the experts, testers and others, is to assume that the
prior odds are 1:1, sometimes justified on the ground that this reflects
an attempt to be impartial by assuming that either the plaintiff or the
defendant is or is not telling the truth. The second step is to multiply
the odds of 1:1 by a fraction, the numerator of which is the probability
46. Homer H. Clark, Jr. & Carol Glowinsky, Domestic Relations: Cases & Materials 328 (5th
ed. 1995).
47. Id. (citing Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Rules 73440
(2d ed. 1993)).
48. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-
Reaching Implication of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific
Enterprise, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 55 (1995).
49. D. H. Kaye, Plemel as a Primer on Proving Paternity, 24 Willamette L. Rev. 867, 877
(1988); see also Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 46, at 328-29.
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that the defendant is the child's father and the denominator is the
probability that a man chosen at random from the population is the
father. In other words the numerator is the probability, in terms of a
percentage figure that a man having the defendant's genotypes would
transmit the necessary genes to the child, given the mother's genotypes.
The denominator is the probability, expressed as a percentage figure,
that a mythical randomly chosen man could transmit those genes to the
child, taking into account the mother's genes. In fact the denominator
of the fiaction turns out to be the percentage of men of the same race
in the population who possess the haplotypes possessed by the child and
not received from the mother. When that fraction so computed is
converted into a whole number, that number, expressed usually as a
percentage, is the Paternity Index. The Paternity Index multiplied by
the conventional prior odds of 1:1 does not change in value.s
Non-statistical or blood testing evidence must be adduced to avoid significant
error. Commentators warn that although courts and experts often label the
paternity index as the probability of paternity, this use of the PI is improper."s
The paternity index is really nothing more than "a comparison between the
probability that the defendant transmitted the necessary genes to the child with
the statistical incidence of those genes in the general population." '52 In a case
in which it was stated by an expert that the alleged father's "chance of paternity"
was 99.4%, this really meant that the odds of his being father were 178 to .'3
D. DNA Testing
Forensic scientists long have dreamed of a process that can place a suspect
at a crime scene [or prove paternity] with absolute certainty using a minute
amount of physical evidence.' DNA comparison appeared to be close to that
ideal. Since its development ten or so years ago, the popular press has
sensationalized the use of DNA fingerprinting."3 Its proponents claim that it is
possible to determine that unique code by testing bodily fluid and other tissue.
If sufficiently perfected to establish paternity affirmatively and with certainty, all
the other complex and elaborate blood and tissue testing would be rendered
50. Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 46, at 328-29.
51. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 329.
53. Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209 (Or. 1987), discussed in Clark & Glowinsky, supra note
46, at 314-28.
54. Jon Thames, It's Not Bad Law-It's Bad Science: Problems With Expert Testimony in Trial
Proceedings, 18 Am. J. Trial Adv. 545 (1995).
55. E.g., Scientists Create First Genetic Map Designed to Track Causes of Illnesses, Houston
Chron. at 9 (Oct. 8, 1987), noted in Michael Mouri, The Myth of the DNA Fingerprint-Is It For
Real?, 37 Med. Trial Tech. Q. 337, 338 (1991).
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obsolete.56 DNA identification evidence is and should be a powerful tool in
identifying parents and children.57 DNA testing, however, is no panacea.
Problems exist relating to the population bases and to the processes of gathering,
storing, and testing evidence. We will focus on these below.
Over the last several years, molecular biology has advanced to the degree
that it has revolutionized and simplified the problem of identification.
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing has been applied in criminal cases, such
as the Buckland Case, in England. This case involved the first forensic use of
DNA testing to convict an individual.58
Genetic codes have been found in every cell of all tissue that has a nucleus.
Except for identical twins or triplets, etc., everyone's genetic code is unique;
chromosomes within human cells have a pattern that apparently is unique and
distinct."' It is an identifier like a fingerprint.' The F.B.I. and the uniformed
military services, along with the Department of Defense are, as of 1991,
conducting studies on the application of DNA fingerprinting for identification.
The methods used by the major laboratories include the following standard
biomedical techniques: DNA cleavage with restriction endonuclease, Southern
blotting after gel electrophoresis, recombinant DNA cloning of the probes,
hybridization and gene amplification.6 ' The Washington Supreme Court
explained:
Human genes, the fundamental units of heredity, are made up of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). The DNA molecule consists of a long
string of repeating units, nucleotides, in two strands resembling a spiral
staircase (a double helix). The nucleotides, which are ofjust four types,
are paired across the two strands in complementary sequence (they will
only pair in certain combinations). Except for identical twins, the
complete sequence of base pairs in the DNA is unique for every person.
Most of human DNA is the same from person to person, but a very
56. Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 46, at 347 (citingMichael Henry and Victoria Schwartz,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support, A Guide for Judges in Child
Support Enforcement 84 (2d ed. 1987) (describing the DNA testing procedure); David B. Jackson,
DNA Fingerprinting and Proof of Paternity, 15 Fano. L. Rptr. 3007 (1989) (with more detail); see
also Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (which approved the admission of
DNA test results in a criminal case); In re Baby Girl S., 532 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1988)
(DNA test evidence admitted in paternity case).
57. Cf Koehler, supra note 3, at 21.
58. Anthony Schmitz, Murder on Black Pad, Hippocrates 49-58 (Jan./Feb. 1988).
59. Julie G. Shoop, Is DNA Typing Ready for Trial?, 26 Trial I I (Sept. 1990); K. F. Kelly et
al., Methods and Application of DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide for the Non.Scientist, 1987 Crim. L.
Rev. 105, 105-06 (1987); Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific "Fingerprints " of Human DNA,
316 Nature 76, 77 (1985); Lee Thaggard, Note, DNA Fingerprinting: Overview of the Impact of the
Genetic Witness on the American System of Criminal Justice, 61 Miss. L.J. 423, 424 (1991).
60. See Mouri, supra note 55, at 344. See also supra notes 38-59, infra notes 79-231, 247.272.
61. These techniques and the history of their development are discussed in Mouri, supra note
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small percentage differs from person to person. The differences are
polymorphisms, and are the key to DNA typing. One type of polymor-
phism consists of variations in the length of DNA at specific locations
(loci) consisting of short repeating DNA sequences called VNTRs
(variable number of tandem repeats). The physical length of the DNA
molecule at these loci depends upon the number of short repeating
sequences. In the human population there are many versions of the
DNA at a specific locus-these are called alleles. VNTRs are examined
(typed) by the RFLP technique (restriction fragment length polymor-
phism analysis). If a suspect's blood sample is found to "match" that
of a forensic sample, then mathematical and statistical methods are used
to estimate the frequency of the genetic profile in major population
groups.6
2
On the other hand, particular parts of the DNA molecule examined
specifically in a given test may be identical to a particular part of another
person's DNA molecule. This requires testing laboratories to calculate how
likely it is that a given match occurred by chance matching of two portions from
two different persons.'
DNA testing requires a six-step process to determine, in a paternity action,
whether the molecular structure of the alleged father matches that of his alleged
child in such a manner that a scientist could say that the man was the father."
If the prints do not match, the man is not the father.6' The scientist will
compare the alleged father's DNA to that represented in a laboratory database
which contains samples from at least one hundred men of the same or similar
race, calculating the frequency with which the subject's fingerprint or other
bodily material is found in such a population." From this calculation the
62. State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1315-16 (Wash. 1996) (citing Committee on DNA
Technology in Forensic Science, DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992)); Howard Coleman &
Eric Swenson, DNA in the Courtroom: A Trial Watcher's Guide 29-42 (1994); and State v.
Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993).
63. Shoop, supra note 59, at 11; Thaggard, supra note 59, at 427-28.
64. For a helpful survey of the whole process, which provides analysis and tips for choosing
a laboratory and trial preparation, see Angela Arkin Byne, Using DNA Evidence to Prove Paternity:
What the Attorney Needs to Know, 19 Farn. L. Rptr. 3001 (1992); see also J. Michael Coineally,
Review-Essay, Reference Manual on DNA Evidence, 36 Jurimetrics J. 193 (1996).
65. Massachusetts v. Breadmore, 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992); David B. Jackson, DNA
Fingerprinting and Proof of Paternity, 15 Faro. L. Rptr. 3007 (1989).
66. Byne, supra note 64, at 3001; Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important
Questions, Surprising Answers, 76 Judicature 222 and n.1 (1993); United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F.
Supp. 250, 253 (D.C. Vt. 1990), afld, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992) (every FBI database contains at
least 200 individuals), superseded to adopt the Daubert standard, but proposition in text stands, with
even more force. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct.
2786 (1993); cf United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1994) (relating to sentencing
guidelines).
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likelihood of fatherhood will supposedly be determined.6' We will see below
that the various population genetic theories utilized for this calculation are
currently in hot debate.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:441.1 codifies the use of DNA, blood and
saliva testing as relevant proof in identifying and convicting individuals for
crimes committed in conformity with the Louisiana Code of Evidence. No civil
counterpart to Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:441.1 has been enacted in
Louisiana, except insofar as it is listed in Civil Code article 187 for disavowal
purposes, and is recognized as a means of proving paternity via Civil Code
articles 208 and 209. DNA matching is available and valuable for many
important purposes, including those relating to family law, such as establishing
who both parents of a child are when the child hbs been adopted or has been
abandoned.'
E. More General Louisiana Blood Testing Legislation
Louisiana adopted, in its entirety, the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity in 1972 [Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396, et seq.].
Apparently, "the legislature intended to provide a carefully regulated evidentiary
procedure having precedence over laws of general applicability. '"69 Whether all
of this legislation is "careful" is open to question. "The thrust of the statute is
to make available scientific evidence, adduced through medical experts appointed
by the court and called to testify by the court."7  It has been held to be
constitutional in Louisiana."
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 provides the authority for a trial court to
order blood samples to be drawn in any civil action in which paternity is a
relevant fact so that inherited characteristics in the samples may be determined
by appropriate testing procedures.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397 provides for selection of experts to conduct
the tests.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.2 provides for proof of the chain of
custody of the blood samples to meet the requirements of the admissibility of the
blood test results.' 2
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.3 focuses on the admissibility and effect
of blood test results. It provides that, "[i]f the court finds that the conclusions
67. Byne, supra note 64; Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. at 253.
68. See Wing K. Fung et al., Determination of Both Parents Using DNA Profiling, 36
Jurimetrics J. 337 (1996).
69. Jones v. Thibodeaux, 445 So. 2d 44, 47 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 448 So. 2d 112
(1984).
70. Id.
71. E.g., Didier v. Fasola, 597 So. 2d 450, 451-52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
72. Handier v. Stanford, 590 So. 2d 748, 750 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991). See discussion of chain
of custody and other related matters infra text accompanying notes 230-236.
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of all the experts as disclosed by the reports, based upon the tests, are that the
alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall be
resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the
question shall be submitted upon all the evidence."
F. Entranced by Science. Burden Proof in Louisiana Since 1995-Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:397.3(B)(1)(b), As Amended in 1995
In 1995, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.3(B)(l)(b) was amended to create
a rebuttable presumption of paternity when a validly certified blood report
indicates a 99.9% or greater "probability that [he] is [the father]." '  This
presumption is questionable; it is misleading as to the real value of the statistical
evidence. It inaccurately describes what the testing does and what the statistics
mean. It may mislead the trier of fact as to the actual valid impact or meaning
of the testing. If the population base is such that the percentage could actually
include some 50,000 potential fathers, why should not the claimant be required
to establish that some timely sexual access occurred? Now that the presumption
has changed the traditional rule on corroboration, it is fully up to counsel for the
alleged father to dislodge it. The danger lies in the tendency to be overwhelmed
by scientific, mathematical, or statistical evidence or in using it as a talisman.
This is not what Louisiana legislation or jurisprudence has required in the past
and there is serious question about the validity or propriety of doing so now.
Whether a plaintiff has met the burden of proof and presented sufficient
evidence of paternity is a determination for the trier of fact.74 We have already
seen, and will develop this further below, that scientific testing is open to criticism
and should not be the sole factor in determining paternity. 7 Alone, scientific
testing is insufficient to meet the standard (preponderance of the evidence required)
to prove paternity. 76 Nevertheless, some states are providing that when a person
attempts to "challenge a support order on the basis of non paternity without
externally obtained clear medical proof," the challenge should be rejected."
We will focus on the reliability of the claim that scientific testing establishes
such a presumption. Suffice it to say at this point that to suggest that testing can
produce a 99.9% or higher "probability of fatherhood" is misleading in many
circumstances. What does the statistical percentage really mean? What is the
73. La. R.S. 9:397.3(B)(2)(b) (Supp. 1996); see also La. Civ. Code art. 209(A) and (B); State
v. Simien, 677 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472, 474 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1993).
74. See Didier, 597 So. 2d at 456; Litton, 624 So. 2d at 475; State v. Smith, 605 So. 2d 222,
224 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
75. E.g., State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dorsey, 665 So. 2d 95, 96 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995).
76. McKenzie v. Thomas, No. 95-CA-2226, 1996 WL 375017 (La. App. 1st Cir. June 28,
1996); State v. Guichard, 655 So. 2d 1371, 1379-80 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 660 So. 2d 454
(1995); Litton, 624 So. 2d at 476.
77. E.g., Leiter v. Scott, 654 N.E.2d 742 (Ind. 1995).
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population base and what is its impact on the potentiality of fatherhood? One must
ask whether the trier of fact and counsel are capable of understanding the
complexities of the mathematical information. If not, can they apply any
appropriate value to the probabilistic evidence? We will consider, below, the
complexities and vagaries of the scientific and statistical quagmire that courts find
themselves in and will indicate why corroboration should still be required.
G. Problems in Testing Procedure- "Procedural Errors "-1995 Amendment
and Re-enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.3(B)
In 1995, the Legislature attempted to provide protection against errors in taking
blood or tissue samples, their labeling, storage, shipping, testing, or in other parts
of the chain of custody. The legislation provided:
B. (1) If the court finds there has been a procedural error in the adminis-
tration of the tests, the court shall order an additional test made by the
same laboratory or expert.
(2)(a) If there is no timely challenge to the testing procedure or
if the court finds there has been no procedural error in the
testing procedure, the certified report shall be admitted in
evidence at trial as prima facie proof of its contents, provided
that the party against whom the report is sought to be used may
summon and examine those making the original of the report as
witnesses under cross-examination.
(b) A certified report of blood or tissue sampling which indicates
by a ninety-nine and nine-tenths percentage [99.9%] point
threshold probability that the alleged father is the father of the
child creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity. (emphasis
added).
The term "procedural error" in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.3(B)(2)(a)
includes errors in the taking of the samples, their storage, shipping, testing and
breach of or failure to verify chain of custody in the proper, sworn affidavit.78
It has been held to be untimely to wait some eight months after notice of the
filing of the blood test report to challenge the results of blood and tissue tests."'
The legislation provides no indication of what will rebut the presumption. The
statute should call for corroborating evidence because the so-called percentage
determined does not have much meaning if no evidence of access or the like is also
presented. As noted above, the jurisprudence requires such corroboration."
78. State Dep't of Social Serv. v. White, 651 So. 2d 366, 369 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
79. Id. at 368; Rigaud v. Deruise, 539 So. 2d 979 (La. App. 4th Cir. i989), appeal after
remand, 613 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
80. E.g., Litton, 624 So. 2d at 475. See also generally State v. Dorsey, 665 So. 2d 95, 96 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1995); State v. Simien, 677 So. 2d 1138, 1144 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Didier v.
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H. Elaboration of Issues Surrounding "Procedural Error"
DNA evidence, when admitted, often holds an aura of virtual certainty. 81
Nevertheless, the testing procedure is rife with potential error. Any form of
scientific analysis is subject to error. Indeed, although a laboratory may have
reported a match may be highly suggestive of a true match, it is not the same as a
true match. 2 The opportunity for error occurs at each stage of the procedure and
the concerns of misrepresentation or misinterpretation increase as the stages of the
process cumulate. Each phase is part of a chain of inferences which is cumula-
tive.83 Thus, even as the inferences drawn from each phase are cumulative, so are
the opportunities for error, creating the potential for erroneous results.' 4 Failure
to follow proper procedure at any stage makes error more likely at that stage and
the potential cumulates over the chain of stages and the inferences drawn
therefrom. 5 Professor Jonathan Koehler explains that many experts, judges, and
attorneys "not only fail to see the cumulative nature of the problems that can occur
when moving along the inferential chain, but they frequently confuse the
probabilistic estimates that are reached at one state with estimates of the others....
[T]he resulting misrepresentation and misinterpretation of these estimates lead to
exaggerated expressions about the strength and implications of the DNA
evidence."'"
A National Institute of Justice study sent samples of blood, among other items
of physical evidence to more than 200 police laboratories in the United States and
Canada for scientific analysis. The results were that 71% of the blood samples
were misidentified 7 Efforts in proficiency testing, perhaps, have increased the
quality."
Fasola, 597 So. 2d 450, 454 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991); State ex rel. Gray v. Hogan, 613 So. 2d 681,
683 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993); State v. Montgomery, 574 So. 2d 1297, 1301 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 577' So. 2d 38 (1991).
81. Some courts so hold. See, e.g., Colorado v. Fishback, 829 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991),
aff'd, 851 P.2d 884, 892 (1993) (claiming that DNA testing is "failsafe"); Missouri v. Davis, 814
S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1991) (claiming an accuracy rate is 100%); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 890
(Fla. App. 1988), affd, 542 So. 2d 1332 (1989). Cf Pace v. State, 648 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1995);
Interest of J.M., 590 So. 2d 454 (La. 1991).
82. See supra note 81. See also Steven Terry, Development: Evidence, 22 Win. Mitchell L.
Rev. 237, 238-39 (1996).
83. Koehler, supra note 3. at 22.
84. Id.; Leslie Roberts, DNA Fingerprinting: Academy Reports, 256 Science 300 (April 17,1992).
85. Koehler, supra note 3, at 22; State Dep't of Social Serv. v. White, 651 So. 2d 366, 368 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1995); Rigaud v. Deruise, 539 So. 2d 979 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989), appeal afler
remand, 613 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
86. Koehler, supra note 3, at 22.
87. Jon P. Thames, It's Not Bad Law-It's Bad Science: Problems With Expert Testimony in
Trial Proceedings, 18 Am. J. Trial Adv. 545, 547 (1995) (citing Michael J. Saks, Accuracy v.
Advocacy: Expert Testimony Before the Bench, 90 Tech. Rev. 42, 47 (Aug.-Sept. 1987)).
88. See Assuring the Quality of Laboratory Tests, 267 J.A.M.A. 1722 (Apr. i, 1992) (for health
care labs, but not for forensic labs).
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Laboratory experts have not only been known to make errors, they have been
known to cheat. For example, one was found to have committed "acts of
misconduct," including: "(1) overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the
frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the
frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that
multiple items had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5)
reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory
records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that genetic
markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report conflicting
results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve
conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing supported
only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible or
improbable results."'"
Any reasonably effective defense can mount a substantial attack on such
evidence, but this requires a defense team with sufficient expertise. 9  The
following thoughts about what should be in interrogatories may be helpful in cases
where scientific testing results are at issue. It would be worthwhile for counsel to
work with scientists to develop interrogatories designed to expose error.9'
"Accuracy of test results requires a competent staff and a properly designed set
of laboratory procedures."' 2 Poor lab work or poor gathering or storing tech-
niques can cause controversy and error masked with the aura of science.93
Laboratory error includes all human and technical errors, including: mislabelings,
misrecordings, misrepresentations, case mix-ups, contaminations, and all sorts of
interpretive errors.'4 The DNA replication process that makes possible the testing
of minute samples or the repeated testing of small samples lends itself to the
possibility of problems of contamination, which will confuse and cause error; since
89. Matter of Investigation of West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory Serology Div., 438
S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993), noted and discussed in West's Legal News, Criminal Justice: Witness
Credibility-DNA Expert Who Helped Convict Innocent May Elude [Perjury] Charges, 11/13/96
West's Legal News 12118, 1996 WL 655016. See also Ex Parte Jean Matthews, No. 176-95, 1996
WL 604183 (Tex. Cr. App. Oct. 23, 1996).
90. Thames, supra note 54, at 557.
91. For sample interrogatories to consider and other questions to ask, see discussion in
Blakesley, supra note 38, Ch. 6, § 6.13.
92. Sylvia lannucci, Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Standards for
Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717, app. at 738; see Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA
Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 Stan. L. Rev 465,493-95
(1990), Thames, supra note 54, at 547-48. There are certain problems inherent in any, even
excellent, laboratory environment.
93. See Thames, supra note 54, at 557 (citing Hoeffel, supra note 92, at 480); see also
Christopher G. Shank, Note, DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials: Modifying the Law's Approach to
Protect the Accused from Prejudicial Genetic Evidence, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 829 (1992); cf. Thomas M.
Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4th 313 (1991 and
Supp. 1996).
94. Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant
and Prejudicial?, 35 Jurimetrics J. 201, 203, n.7 (1995).
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most samples comefrom sources that may be contaminated with bacteria, there is
the possibility that the DNA replicated is that of the contaminant.95 There is a
constant danger of samples being switched, of cross-contamination, and of contami-
nation of the sample-taking. Errors are not uncommon in relation to the storing of
tools or devices involved in the taking, storing, and sending of the samples to the
testing laboratory. Moisture and bacteria can cause DNA degradation.'
Bacteria, foreign blood, or other material may contaminate the materials or
tools utilized in the testing. Contaminated tools contaminate the sample.
Misleading results thus occur. Dr. Michael Baird, Director of Forensic and
Paternity Testing at Lifecodes, testified in the famous Castro case that his company
knowingly continued to use contaminated containers and tools used in the testing
process. Indeed, "it was not his practice to even bother to record in a laboratory
notebook the fact that a probe was found to be contaminated." 1 This practice
"virtually invites the occurrence of false positives and false negatives." It is
reported that many laboratory technicians are hardworking, dedicated, and capable.
Some are simply incompetent."
Notwithstanding this potentiality for error, recent Louisiana decisions have
held that where.a paternity expert testifies that an accurate protocol was followed
in processing the evidence, the trial court should admit the expert's report.100
This is fine, as long as there is a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine someone
who has the pertinent knowledge of the actual testing. Prior Louisiana jurispru-
dence always required corroboration of the scientific evidence. Otherjurisdictions
do the same and some require precise indication of the true value of the scientific
testing and the exact process utilized in the particular case. For example, British
Courts of Appeal have recently laid down guidelines for the introduction of DNA
evidence. The decisions required that "the methodology of DNA analysis and
statistical calculation be as transparent as possible to the defence and ... required
fair and accurate explanation of the evidence" and its true value. They held that it
was improper for scientific experts to "overstep the line into the province of [the
trier of fact]: they should state, on the basis of the statistical data, the 'random
95. See P. Michael Conneally, Review Essay: Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 36
Juremetrics J. 193, 195-96 (1996); Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Admissibiliy, In Prosecution for
Sex-Related Offense. of Results of Tests on Semen or Seminal Fluids, 75 A.L.R. 4th 897, at §§ 8. 11.
15(f) (1990); Fleming, supra note 93.
96. Thaggard, supra note 59, at 442; Debm Cassens Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints, 74
A.B.A. J., May I, 1989. at 67.
97. Dr. Eric S. Lander, Expert's Report at 23, In People v. Castro, No. 1508/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989) (on file with Stanford Law Review); see also Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial,
339 Nature 501, 503 (1989).
98. Lander, Castro Expert's Report, supra note 97, at 6.
99. Ronald J. Bretz, Sclentific Evidence and the Frye Rule: The Case for a Cautious Approach,
4 Cooley L. Rev. 506,518 (1987); Thames, supra note 54, at 547-48; Hoeffel, supra note 92, at 493-
95.
100. Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472, 475 (La. App. 2d Cir.1993); cf State In re Braden v.
Nash, 550 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
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occurrence ration' [sic] (the frequency with which matching DNA. characteristics
would be found in the population at large), but should not express an opinion as to
the likelihood that the DNA found and tested was the defendant's." Moreover, the
defense should be told the "basis used in calculating the random occurrence
ratio .. ."10
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.3(B) provides that if a court finds a
"procedural error in the administration of the tests, the court shall order an
additional test made by the same laboratory or expert." A procedural error may be
raised by the court upon its own motion."02 This is really a substantive rule,
designed to protect against errors which may cause false positives or false
negatives.
It is a false claim that 'false positives" may not be caused by human error.
Most false positives are caused by human error. It is frequently stated, incorrectly,
that false positives are impossible in DNA (RFLP) analysis."03 Whether a "false
positive" can be generated by DNA tests depends on how one defines "false
positive." If the definition asks whether there can be a "false positive" if the actual
testing system fails, then there is little likelihood that there can be a "false positive."
If the definition asks if human error or design can cause a "false positive," the
answer, as in any science, is obviously yes."° The major problem with the
"presumption" in the Uniform Blood Testing Act'O5 is that it nearly ignores the
truth that false positives arise from human error and nearly prevents establishment
of actual, specific errors committed by technicians or scientists. Although there are
few published studies of actual error rate in forensic DNA testing, those which have
been done seem to suggest an error rate of about one percent (one false positive in
every 100 samples).'"
I. Problems, Difficulties and Controversies
Professor Jon Thames recently noted many of the problems and controversies
relating to DNA testing."° In the early days of DNA testing, fairly large trace
samples were required, and the process was limited to analyzing blood and
101. R. v. Doherty and R. v. Adams, The Times (London) Aug. 8, 1996, at 33, and in 17-18
Bull. Legal Developments 203-04 (U.K., Sept. 16, 1996).
102. State Dep't of Social Serv. v. White, 651 So. 2d 366, 369-70 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
103. See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 175 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aftd, 12 F.3d 540 (6th
Cir. 1993); Koehler, supra note 3, at 23 nn.4-9; Richard A. Nakashima, DNA Evidence In Criminal
Trials: A Defense Attorney's Primer. 74 Neb. L. Rev. 444, 464 (1995).
104. Gerald Sheindlin, DNA: Is the Presentation of Statistical Evidence Necessary?, 214 N.Y.
L.J. 1 (col. 1) (Aug. 4, 1995).
105. La. R.S. 9:396 (Supp. 1996).
106. Nakashima, supra note 103, at 464; cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2787 (1993) (noting the known or potential error rate as one of factors).
Daubert is analyzed Infra text accompanying notes 279-301.
107. Thames, supra note 54.
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semen. 10 Recent developments in DNA replication, however, have made testing
minute samples of blood, semen, hair follicles, saliva, or skin tissue possible.' 9
Courts in both the civil and criminal arenas have rushed to embrace this new
technology."0 Its value is great and its use is quite appropriate, although the
embrace is somewhat overdone. One court thrilled to the vision that DNA testing
"constitute(s) the single greatest advance in the 'search for truth,' and the goal of
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, since the advent of cross-
examination.""' Experts sometimes claim that DNA testing is infallable. This,
indeed, is a serious problem facing the judiciary. First, it is not true. Second, it is
claimed quite often. For example, actual testimony of experts in courts has
included statements like the following. "[I]t is technically impossible to make a
false/positive identification."" 2 "There is no way to get a false positive with this
technology.." DNA analysis is "failsafe.'. The accuracy rate is 100%." s
Professor Koehler quotes from the transcript of a Texas case:
Q: Now, you're telling us that you can only get a result or no result; is
that correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: And you couldn't get a false positive?
A: There's nothing like a false positive in this, no.
Q: How about if you use the wrong sample?
A: If you use the wrong sample?
Q: (Nods head).
A: You either get a result, or you don't get a result. There's no false
positives."'
"These claims are extremely misleading and may be reversible error."" 7 The
trier of fact really needs to determine how likely it is that the reported match is or
is not a true match."' The cumulation of procedural errors makes the possibility
109. Id. at 554.
109. Id. at 554-57 (citing Lome T. Kirby, DNA Fingerprinting: An Introduction (1990)).
110. Thames, supra note 54, at 554-57.
111. Id. (citing New York v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany Cty. Ct. 1988)).
112. Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990) (transcript at 677), cited and quoted in Koehler,
supra note 3. at 23 n.4.
113. Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), cited and quoted in Koehler, supra
note 3. at 23 n.S.
114. People v. Fishback, 929 P.2d 489 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 851 P.2d 884 (1993), cited and
quoted in Koehler, supra note 3, at 23 n.7.
115. State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1991) (transcript at 82), cited in Koehler, supra note
3, at 23 n.8. See also additional authority in Professor Koehler's article, especially in notes 8 and
9.
116. Koehler, supra note 3, at n.9 (quoting from transcript of State v. Bethune, 821 S.W.2d 222
(Tex. App. 1991) (transcript at 2228)).
i17. Koehler, supra note 3, at 24.
118. Id.
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of error increase. Errors occur! Their occurrence has been documented in both
laboratory proficiency tests and in actual casework.1 9 It is clear that technical
failures occur. For this reason alone, the infallibility claims ought to be forbid-
den.'20 When one adds the astounding claims of probability that are presented,
the danger of error is obvious. Some of these have included: "the probability of
selecting an unrelated individual of the population from the same race•., who had
a genetic profile matching [defendant] was one in ten billion."'' As discussed
before, laboratory experts not only make errors, they have been known to
cheat. "
It is not clear that these claims of infallibility are true. We will consider,
below, the vigorous debate over these statistics and the population studies that back
them up. The six-step methodology is described above.23 In summary, it works
as follows.' 2' The legal factfinder is told by an expert that the blood or tissue of
the relevant parties "matches." This match is generally represented by what is
called a "random match probability" (RMP).' The RMP signals the "probabili-
ty that the DNA profile of a randomly selected person from some reference
population (e.g., a racial group) will match the profile of the [evidence].' 26
There is still a dearth of relevant population studies necessary to attach any real
degree of significance to a given match. 2 7  Indeed, some argument remains
regarding the scientific validity of DNA testing itself.' Notwithstanding all of
the controversy, Professor Thames admits that one may characterize the process as
"a breakthrough." He argues, however, that although it is here to stay, DNA testing
presents a difficult situation for the courts because it is a process that the legal
profession "may not know how to properly use."' 9
Although the contributors to legal literature are at odds over the efficacy and
even the validity of the process, 30 apparently the only successful challenges of
119. Id. (citing California Ass'n of Crime Laboratory Directors, DNA Committee Rpt. No. 6
(Oct. 1, 1988)); Simon Ford & William C. Thompson, A Question ofIdentity: Some Reasonable
Doubts About DNA "Fingerprints, "30 Sciences 37 (Jan.-Feb. 1990); Lander, supra note 97; William
C. Thompson & Simon Ford, The Meaning of a Match: Sources of Ambiguity in the Interpretation
of DNA Prints, In Forensic DNA Technology 93 (Mark A. Farley & James J. Harrington, eds., 1991).
120. Koehler, supra note 3. at 24.
121. Knight v. State, 435 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Ga. App. 1993) (criminal case), quoted in Koehler
et al., supra note 94, at 202 n.3; see also additional authority in that footnote.
122. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
124. As explained this time by Koehler et al., supra note 94, at 202.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Dan L. Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28
Jurimetrics J. 455, 465-66 (1988).
128. See supra notes 107-127, infra notes 129-224 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. Thames, supra note 54. Also, compare Hoeffel, supra note 92 (contending that the process
fails the Frye standard, the test of relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches, and the defendant's right to privacy) with
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DNA evidence in court have been those that accept the process but attack its
implementation. 3'
J. The Problem with "Matching"
An important area of controversy relates to matching. Professor Thames
explains that the bands produced by the DNA testing process do not fall on a
single point but appear across a spectrum of points. "A value is given by
determining where the darkest point occurs. This can be done by 'eyeball' or
relegated to a computer.'3 ' The FBI uses a computer, but the analyst may
override the computer's placement of the marker,'3 and no record is kept of
the override. 34  There is no standard for declaring matches."'"3  If this can
be done and no record is kept, there is opportunity for error and there may be
no opportunity to prove the error, unless one is able to cross-examine the actual
principals.
K. Controversy-the Use of DNA Statistical Evidence and Human Error
DNA testing is not a panacea. DNA evidence has been touted as being
nearly infallible.' 36 Prosecutors (and parties alleging paternity) have felt
[traditionally] that it is their courtroom ally.' The most realistic opportunity
for attacking DNA testing today probably rests in the establishment of errors in
and attacks on the test as conducted from the time the evidence is gathered,
while it is shipped and stored, to the time it is tested and its results reported. 3 '
Suzanne H. Stenson, Comment, Admit h*! DNA Finger Printing Is Reliable, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 677
(1989) (supporting the use of DNA testing).
131. Thames, supra note 54 (citing, e.g.. New York v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. CL
1989).
132. Thames, supra note 54, at 556 (citing Kirby, supra note 109, at 117-18).
133. Thames. supra note 54, at 556.
134. Id.
135. Hoeffel, supra note 92, at 486-92.
136. The tendency of experts to claim testing infallability is one of the serious problems facing
the judiciary. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990) ("[l]t is technically impossible
to make a false/positive identification." (transcript at 677)); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.
App. 1990) ("There is no way to get a false positive with this technology." (transcript at 919)).
Cases cited and quoted by Koehler, supra note 3, at 23 and n.4.
137. Rorie Sherman, DNA Unraveling, 15 The Nat'l L.J. I (col. 1) (Feb. 1, 1993) (noting that
there appears to have been a dramatic shift toward defense counsel in the vigorous tug-of-war with
prosecutors regarding this evidence); Denise A. Filocoma, Comment, Unravelling the DNA
Controversy: Wesley, A Step In the Right Direction, 3 J.L. & Pol'y 537, 542 (1995) (analyzing the
New York Court of Appeals decision which found "DNA evidence was... generally accepted as
reliable").
138. See also Blakesley, supra note 38; supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text; Edward J.
lmwinkelried, Criminal Law Symposium: The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for
the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Foucusis
Misanalysis, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 19 (1991); Matthew Goldstein, At Ease With Tough High-Profile
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This is in the arena of the "procedural error."'39 Again, Professor Jon Thames
has noted:"4
... [c]ontroversy exists in the conversion of matching into
probabilities. In New York v. Castro,"' an expert from Lifecodes
Laboratories cited the probabilities of a random match as one in
100,000,000 while the defense expert, using Lifecodes' published
procedures, calculated the odds as one in 78 and, using the FBI
methodology, as one in 24.142 The National Research Council at-
tempted to resolve this problem in its 1992 report 43 proposing a
"modified ceiling" approach.'" The major element of this method
seems to involve assigning a minimum interim ceiling frequency of ten
percent on any individual locus."' In State v. Cauthron, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court adopted this position stating, "Although we lack the
scientific expertise to either assess or explain the methodology, its
adoption by the (NRC) Committee indicates that sufficient acceptance
within the scientific community has been achieved to satisfy Frye in
appropriate circumstances.""'
Currently, state courts are "grappling" with the issues of DNA reliability and
admissibility."' More than one judge has criticized the use of DNA statistical
"expert" evidence. Justice Gerald Sheindlin, one of the more expert in the DNA
arena,"" has argued that:
Cases, 216 N.Y.L.. 1 (col. 1) (Sept. 24, 1996). Professor Thames discusses five points of
controversy and possible error.
139. See discussion of "procedural error," supra notes 78-108 and accompanying text.
140. Thames, supra note 54.
141. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
142. Hoeffel, supra note 92, at 492 (citing the expert's report in the case).
143. National Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992) (cited in
Minnesota v. All, 504 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
144. Alt, 504 N.W.2d at 50.
145. Id.
146. Thames, supra note 54 (citing State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 517 (Wash. 1993)).
147. See, e.g., James Morgan, DNA Profiling in North Carolina, 21 N.C. Cent. L.J 300 (1995)
(discussing "the reliability and the credence the North Carolina courts have given DNA analysis");
Scott D. Sherwood, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Defines the Standard of Admissibilityfor DNA
Evidence at Trial-Commonwealth v. Crews, 640A.2d395 (Pa.1994), 68 Temple L. Rev. 953 (1995)
(discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's admission of testimony concerning DNA matching)
Michael J. Short, Forensic DNA Analysis: An Examination of Common Objections Raised to the
Admission of DNA Fingerprinting as Illustrated by State v. Pierce, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 133 (1993)
(discussing the admissibility of DNA testing in criminal trials); Sarah E. Snyder, Note, Experimental
or Demonstrable: Has DNA Testing TDuly Emerged from the Twilight Zone? An Assessment of
Washington's Response to DNA Identification, 31 Willamette L. Rev. 201 (1995) (discussing
Washington state's handling of the introduction of DNA evidence in criminal trials).
148. Justice Gerald Sheindlin is a New York City criminal court judge, who also sits on the State
Supreme Court. He is an expert on DNA evidence, has written two books on the subject, and has
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While fully capable of understanding the scientific process used to
generate the evidence, the trial lawyers and judge were confused and in
awe of the analysis of complicated concepts such as Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium, linkage equilibrium, Wahlund principle, sub-populations,
population drift, the Gaussian Curve and other mind boggling statistical
complexities used to explain the significance of a match, and deferred
to the population geneticist and statistician.'49
Judge Sheindlin explains the DNA testing process and the nature of the
potentially harmful consequences of allowing "experts to invade the trial with
their language rather than insist that the time honored use of our legal language,
used with success and understanding from time immemorial, be the method by
which expert opinion is presented."' s0 Judge Sheindlin continues in a vein of
criminal law but with pertinence to family law:
Assume that four DNA tests were conducted examining four different
sections of chromosomes'' and a computerized match is observed
between the DNA sample left at the crime scene and the defendant's
DNA.' 52 Then the four separate DNA matches are compared to four
separate databases consisting of a large number of randomly chosen
people whose DNA was previously profiled.'53
Thereafter, for example, if two bands are observed, one at 10KB
and another at 5KB (10,000 and 5,000 base pairs long), in both the
defendant and the random persons tested in the database, and out of 500
people tested only one other person had the same length DNA at both
areas of the chromosome, then the opinion is rendered that the odds of
been a lecturer on that topic for the FBI. He may be most well-known for his decision in the famous
People v. Castro case discussed above. See Goldstein, supra note 138, at col. 3.
149. Gerald Sheindlin, DNA: Is the Presentation of Statistical Evidence Necessary?, 214 N.Y.
L. 1 (col. 1) (Aug. 4, 1995).
150. Id.
151. There are currently 12 different probes developed to inspect nine different sections
of chromosomes. Presently, six probes are the maximum actually utilized to examine
portions of nine chromosomes using the RFLP technique. In PCR, there are approximate-
ly nine different probes that are utilized to examine the genes on about 10 different
chromosomes or sections thereof.
Id. at n.2.
152. In these discussions, it is assumed that the DNA tests were performed correctly and
with integrity. Whether a "false positive" can be generated by DNA tests, depends upon
the definition assigned to "false positive." If the definition asks whether there can be a
"false positive" if the actual testing system fails, then there is little likelihood that there
can be a "false positive." If the definition asks if human error or design can cause a
"false positive," the answer, as in any science, is obviously yes.
Id. at n.3.
153. "For example, the FBI database currently consists of Black, Hispanic, Southeastern
Hispanic, Southwestern Hispanic, Caucasian, and Asian populations." Id. at n.4.
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a random person having this band is I in 500. Then the match for the
next chromosome is compared to a database for that chromosome.
Assuming there are 1,000 people in this database, and there are two
matches at these different lengths of DNA, then again it can be said that
the odds that anyone else having this band is 2 in 1,000 or 1 in 500.
This process continues until the other two matches are compared and
their odds are computed. These figures are then multiplied, one with
the other (i.e. 500 x 500 x 350 x 400),"" producing fantastic numbers
which is the foundation for the opinion that sets forth the odds of
randomly finding anyone else in the relevant population (i.e. Black,
Caucasian, etc.) with the same unique DNA pattern over the four
chromosomes tested.
In the example supplied, assuming a Caucasian defendant, the
expert would render the opinion that the odds of finding a random
person in the Caucasian population with the same genetic pattern is 1
in 35 billion. There are, however, only about 5-6 billion people on
earth. 1ss
1. National Research Council (NRC) "Conservative" Approach
Several state appellate courts, and a United States territory, including
California, Guam, New Mexico, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Washing-
ton, D.C., however, have begun to follow the recommendations of the April 1992
report prepared by the prestigious National Research Council (NRC), and have
refused to admit DNA evidence containing the dramatic statistics shown by the
FBI and commercial laboratories. "6
Many courts have opted for the more conservative applications suggested by
the NRC. The NRC compromise approach, generally considered to be "more
conservative," is indicated by the NRC report and often called the "ceiling
principle" or "ceiling frequency."'' The NRC report recommended that
random samples of 100 persons from each of 15-20 populations, which represent
groups relatively homogeneous genetically, be taken. Researchers are then
advised to take the "ceiling frequency," either the largest frequency in any of the
referenced groups or populations or 5%, whichever is larger. "The use of the
ceitingprinciple yields the same frequency of a given genotype, regardless of the
154. "This is the 'product rule."' Id. at n.S.
155. Sheindlin, supra note 149.
156. Sherman, supra note 137.
157. E.g., State v. Quatrevingt, 617 So. 2d 484, 501 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (referring to the
Report by the National Research Counsel, DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992) [hereinafter
NRC Report]), State v. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d 197 (La. 1996). See C.G.G. Aitken, Evaluating DNA
Evidence for Identtfication, 4 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 49, 61 (1995).
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suspect's ethnic background, because the reported frequency represents a
maximum for any possible ethnic heritage."'5 8
2. Raging Debates
But this "compromise" did not come easily and one wonders whether it is
valid. "Raging" debates arose over population bases and the manner in which
the statistics are computed. 9 Population geneticists and biostatisticians appear
to be divided into three camps: (1) those who believe that the current DNA and
statistical approaches are acceptable; (2) those who believe that, until significant-
ly more research is completed, only estimates employing the ceiling principle
should be admitted at trial; and (3) those who believe that even the NRC
approach fails to provide a generally acceptable method.I" "[T]hey also note
that although Hispanics from Puerto Rico may have a different gene pool than
Hispanics from Spain or South America, these groups are lumped together as
'Hispanics.' Accordingly, they argue that these numbers cannot be multiplied
until the sub-populations are investigated.' 61
Another school of scientists argues that its research reveals that there is little
distinction in the populations tested.62 They find such a small variation
between sub-populations that if the databases were adjusted to account for these
minor distinctions, the ultimate odds, even if lessened, would still be meaningful.
Therefore, they conclude, the numbers generated can be multiplied validly, based
on the current databases. 63
Judge Sheindlin suggests a simpler version of the debate: that the debate
consists of one school of scientists which claims that there are sub-populations
which are not reflected in the laboratory database." They argue, for instance,
that the gene pool for Italians in the Caucasian database may not be the same as
the gene pool for Scandinavians.
158. State v. Quatrevingt, 617 So. 2d 484, 501-02 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), and State v.
Quatrevignt, 670 So. 2d 197, 203-205 (La. 1996) (citing NRC Report, supra note 157, at S-12). The
ceiling principle has been approved as valid in other states. E.g., State v. Johnson, No. CR-95-0393-
PR, 1996 WL 400077 (Ariz. July 16, 1996).
159. See discussion, supra text accompanying notes 140-158, infra notes 161-183; Richard C.
Lewontin & Daniel L. Hart, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 Science 1745 (1991);
Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 Science
1735 (1991). With regard to the use of statistics, the Hardy-Weinberg principles and linkage
equilibrium are the basis for the dispute. See Sheindlin, supra note 149.
160. Allan Sincox & Marijane Hemza-Placek, Challenging the Admissibility ofDNA Testing, 83
Ill B.J. 170, 174 (1995).
161. Hardy-Weinberg principles and linkage equilibrium, see supra text accompanying note 149.
162. Chakraborty & Kidd. supra note 159.
163. Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting, 254 Science 1721 (1991) (reporting
on the vitriolic debate); Lewontin & Hartd, supra note 159 (challenging the statistical validity of DNA
testing); Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 159 (defending the forensic use of these statistics).
164. Lewontin & Hart, supra note 159.
[Vol. 57
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
The reason for the debate over population genetics sub-structuring is
exemplified by the following example. If one builds a database by testing
Hispanic people of Cuban ancestry in Miami, the frequencies determined might
not obtain for Hispanic persons of Mexican ancestry in Los Angeles.""
Dr. Richard Lewontin of Harvard University and Daniel Hartd of Washington
University at St. Louis, "two of the leading lights of population genetics," assert
that the claim made by proponents of "DNA fingerprinting ... that the
probability of two DNA samples matching by chance is minuscule ... like
1:500,000 or 1:738,000,000,000,000, . . . are terribly misleading ... [and]
unjustifiable."'" These scientists argue that there are simply no data on
genetic variation among ethnic groups and subgroups to justify those claims.6
They continue: "the claims are based on misinterpretations of population
genetics theory .... More importantly, they ignore a considerable body of
evidence indicating genetic substructure within what are called the 'Caucasian,'
'black,' and 'Hispanic' populations. [These] are actually each made up of
multiple subpopulations that are genetically diverse. Consequently, with
currently available data, the current method of estimating the probability of a
match by multiplying together the frequencies with which each of the individual
VNTR pattern occurs in a reference database is unjustified."'"
In other words, they argued that the DNA proponents base their claims on
a number of unsupported and insupportable assumptions. The proponents assume
that Blacks, Caucasians, and Hispanics are "homogenous populations undergoing
random mating... ."'" But this, they contend, ignores a considerable body
of evidence which actually indicates that each of these groups is actually made
of multiple sub-populations, each of which is genetically diverse. 7
Moreover, Lewontin and Hartl pointed out that the statistics are more suspect
because demographic evidence indicates that "[t]he notion of an American
'melting pot' is true for some aspects of culture, but certainly not for marriage,
which is strongly affected by religion and ethnicity .... Americans tend to
marry the girl or boy next door. The net effect of propinquity, ethnic preferenc-
es, and religious custom is to produce a population that is highly biologically
subdivided in regard to mating."' 7 ' They suggested, therefore, that the only
way to come up with realistic probability estimates using the existing method is
to look at the allele frequencies within each subgroup and then to multiply them.
Yet data on genetic variation among ethnic subgroups simply do not exist and
obtaining them could take up to fifteen years.'
165. Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried provided the example.
166. Roberts, supra note 163, at 1721; Lewontin & Harti, supra note 159, at 1745.
167. Lewontin & Harti, supra note 159, at 1745-46; Roberts, supra note 163, at 1721.
168. Lewontin & Hart, supra note 159, at 1746.
169. Roberts, supra note 163, at 1722.
170. Id.; Lewontin & Harti, supra note 159, at 1746-1749.
171. Lewontin & Hart, supra note 159, at 1748.
172. Roberts, supra note 163, at 1723.
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On the other hand, the proponents of forensic use of DNA testing argue that
detractors Lewontin and Hart are counting angels on the head of a pin and
"engaging in a fascinating if esoteric academic debate that has almost zero
relevance to the use of DNA fingerprinting in court."'73 Thus, while the
forensic "pragmatists" admit that population substructure may actually exist, they
insist that current procedures are conservative enough to compensate for it. 74
3. A Peace of Sorts
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) entered the fray. In its long-
awaited report on DNA fingerprinting, which took approximately four years to
produce, despite serious strife on the committee, a threatened minority opinion
and countless leaks, the committee produced a unanimous conclusion from what
appears to be a compromise between the above indicated warring camps. 7 '
A new and conservative method to calculate the ratios, which the committee
thinks might end courtroom battles over the validity of the statistics, was
produced. The committee report called for, among many other recommendations,
vigorous quality assurance and mandatory accreditation and proficiency testing,
overseen by scientists, not practitioners.' 7
6
The report adopted the assumption that population subgroups exist, but
"devised a practical and sound approach for accounting for it .... "" They
combined the "multiplication rule" with what they denominate the "ceiling
principle." They claim that this combination will be conservative enough to
protect defendants in criminal cases.'78 The report also indicated that "this new
technology burst on the scene so rapidly that there are essentially no standards
and no regulation-a disturbing prospect since the largest potential source of
error lies in poor laboratory practice."'" The report urged Congress to
promulgate legislation requiring accreditation of all DNA typing laboratories,
173. Id. at 1723; Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 159, at 1735, 1737, 1739.
174. Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 159, at 1735, 1737, 1739; Leslie Roberts, DNA
Fingerprinting: Academy Reports, 256 Science 300 (1992).
175. Roberts, supra note 174, at 300.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 300-01.
178. Id. The ceiling principle has been adopted by courts of many states as being "conserva-
tive," if not "highly conservative," because it understates the rarity of a DNA profile; it provides
profile frequencies that are more common than are deemed likely to be the case. E.g., Common-
wealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass. 1994); Conneally, supra note 95, at 197; Eric E. Wright,
DNA Evidence: Where We've Been, Where We Are, & Where We are Going, 10 Me. B.J. 206, 208,
212 (July 1995). Cf Sue Rosenthal, Note, My Brother's Keeper: A Challenge to the Probative
Value of DNA Fingerprinting, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 195, 204 (1995). But see articles which have
criticized the N.R.C. Report, especially its "ceiling principle": e.g., B. Devlin ct al., Comments on
the Statistical Aspects of the NRC's Report on DNA Typing, 39 J. For. Sci. 28 (1994); J. Cohen, The
Ceiling Principle Is Not Always Conservative in Assigning Genotype Frequencies for Forensic DNA
Testing, 51 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 1165 (1992).
179. Roberts, supra note 174, at 301.
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recommended that the courts allow DNA evidence into evidence only if the
laboratory has been accredited, and recommended that the Department of Health
and Human Services, in consultation with the Department of Justice, be charged
with the task of setting up the accreditation and regulatory program."* It also
recommended that a National Committee Forensic DNA Typing be established
and be housed in the National Institutes of Health or the National Institute of
Standards and Technology to obviate expensive courtroom fights. This
committee is to evaluate new approaches to DNA testing and matching, oversee
the collection of blood samples .for the population studies, and advise the courts
on statistical questions."'
Judge Sheindlin reports that recently, two of the
opposing scientists to this quarrel reconciled their differences in a
published paper and agreed that the dispute is over. They concluded
that the argument was more academic than real and both sets of
numbers (the conservative ceiling principle and the liberal product rule)
should be admitted in evidence for a [trier of fact's] consideration.' 2
Some states which originally refused to admit DNA testing results now allow it,
but only if the so-called "compromise" ceiling principle is applied.'83
Does this "conservative method" of presenting statistics in a DNA case
(ceiling principle) represent too much of a departure from reality? Judge
Sheindlin queries:
Are conservative numbers as mischievous a legal approach as the
presentation of ridiculous astronomical numbers generated by the
product rule? '" Does either approach have any meaningful relation-
ship to the truth we are seeking in the trial of a criminal case? Does
the presentation of these odds even come close to the truth that is being
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Sheindlin, supra note 149. Lewontin and Hartl indeed seem to have backed away from
their vigorous opposition and may have abandoned their "multiplication rule" in relation to genetic
sub-groups. See Daniel L. Haiti & Richard C. Lewontin, DNA Fingerprinting Report (Letter), 260
Sci. 473-74 (1993); Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371
Nature 735 (1994).
183. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992) (Lanigan 1), aJJd after
remand, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass. 1994) (Lanigan 1); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29 (N.M. 1994).
184. In California v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), review granted and
opinion superseded, 39 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Cal. 1995), the court in the original, now superseded, opinion
noted the opinion of Dr. Kenneth Kidd, director of the Yale University DNA laboratory and an
executive of the Human Genome Project, that the product rule is as accurate as any determination
can possibly be: "Although the greater the database the greater the certainty of the estimate, any
difference in estimates over one in a million becomes pragmatically meaningless." See Sheindlin,
supra note 149. See discussion on the "resolution" of this controversey at infra notes 206-223 and
accompanying text.
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sought? Does evidence of negative odds tend to distract the jury? Do
they tend to confuse the real issue?
In order to resolve the issue, we must be sensitive to the real
questions being presented at the trial, to wit: (1) What is the relevance
of the disputed evidence to the defendant on trial? (2) What is the
relationship of DNA evidence to the ultimate question of whether the
guilt of the defendant has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt?'"
Some courts have held that "if an estimated rarity of a DNA profile was not
arrived at in a scientifically generally accepted manner, and so was inadmissible,
then so too was the fact of a match."'" The ceiling principle is criticized
severely." 7 It is charged that the ceiling principle is an unscientific guess at
the best method of overcompensating for the problems of substructuring. On the
other hand, for precisely that reason some courts, in Frye jurisdictions, are now
holding that statistical testimony based on the modified ceiling principle is
admissible even though testimony based on the traditional computation technique
is inadmissible. The theory is that the ceiling principle generally understates the
probability of a random match. 8
If the testing institutions do not agree on a standardized set of enzyme-probe
combinations, they will lack the ability to make appropriate DNA fingerprint
comparison.' 89 All of the private laboratories and the F.B.I. utilize different
DNA tests; there is no standardization or regulation of standards and each lab
utilizes its own statistical basis to determine the "accuracy" of a DNA
match."0
That problem, the need for highly skilled laboratory technicians, other
serious dangers relating to contamination, and errors resulting from faulty "links"
in the chain of evidence, pose serious immediate problems impacting the validity
of any given DNA test result and require vigilance on the part of counsel and the
judiciary. 9'
185. Sheindlin, supra note 149.
186. This is the so-called "no stats, no match" rule. Wright, supra note 178, at 208. See also
People v. Wilds, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 354 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev. granted, 890 P.2d 1115 (1995);
People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 726 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
187. E.g., Wright, supra note 178, at 208-13.
188. Letter from Edward J. Imwinkelried to Christopher L. Blakesley (Sept. 8, 1994) (hereinafter
Imwinkelried Letter) (on file with author). See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass.
1992) (Lanigan 1), affd after remand, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass. 1994) (Lanigan I); State v.
Anderson, 881 P.2d 29 (N.M. 1994).
189. Mouri, supra note 55. at 353.
190. Thaggard, supra note 59, at 442.
191. Mouri, supra note 55, at 353. Problems in DNA testing have been illustrated in several
cases: e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989) (DNA test results unreliable due to manner
in which they were performed)); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); see also Crimes,
Misdemeanors and Molecules, M.D., March 1990, at 41; Gina Kolata, Some Scientists Doubt the
(Vol. 57
1997] CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY 409
The United States Congress's Office of Technology Assessment (the O.T.A.)
has reported that properly performed, DNA tests are reliable, but that there are
problems of human error and improper monitoring of tests. 9 ' This report also
recommended that a DNA databank should be established and standardized, and
that protections for individual privacy should be established.'93 California has
proficiency studies which document a margin of-error.
Judge Sheindlin submits a harsh critique, noting that the use of statistics in
explaining DNA forensic evidence is mischievous and misses the point of a trial.
A trial should be a search for the truth under the rules of evidence. Therefore,
he explains, the most meaningful question presented to the expert should be
whether the disputed genetic evidence is consistent with the defendant's genetic
profile within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.' 94 He argues persua-
sively that this is the legal language which has always been the accepted method
of presenting expert opinions.
The population geneticist answers the question of what the odds are that
anyone else, other than the defendant, could have the genetic characteristic by
citing the proportion of the population that possibly might have it. 9 ' He
reports that the opinion usually takes the following hypothetical form: "The odds
of randomly finding anyone else in the relevant population having that genetic
profile is 1 in 35 billion." He then argues that in no other science is the question
so awkwardly twisted to present matters that are not to be determined by the trier
of fact. The use of negative odds can be extremely unrealistic and distracting.
For example, in the same criminal trial, defense experts offered odds of I in 17,
while prosecution experts stated the odds to be 1 in 60 million.'"
It seems evident, as Judge Sheindlin argues, that
Value of Genetic Fingerprint Evidence, N.Y. Times, January 29, 1990, at A I; DNA Fingerprinting
for Forensic Identification: Potential Effects on Data Interpretation of Subpopulation Heterogeneity
and Band Number Variability, 46 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 358 (1990).
192. U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, (O.T.A.] Report, Genetic Witness:
Forensic Uses of DNA Tests (July, 1990); Thaggard, supra note 59, at 443.
193. O.T.A. Report, supra note 192; Thaggard, supra note 59, at 443.
194. Sheindlin, supra note 149, noting that the evidentiary question of whether such negative
odds result in an impermissible "inference on an inference" has not been argued or analyzed. The
inference from negative odds seeks to exclude other people as depositors of the genetic material and
then seeks the additional positive inference that it was therefore the defendant who deposited the
genetic evidence.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Harris v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1992) (upholding the
use of the Frye standard, but applying case-by-case scrutiny for DNA testing decisions), where the
FBI expert testified that the "likelihood of finding another unrelated individual from the black
population, having a DNA profile like Mr. Harris, is approximately one in eight million." The
conservative FBI binning method was used to calculate the odds. In 1995, Harris was overruled only
in its use of the Frye standard, in favor of a Daubert approach, but the case-by-case determination
'of DNA's impact was retained with emphasis! Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101
(Ky. 1995)). Judge Sheindlin cites other cases as well.
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[i]n view of the fact that most laboratories, including the FBI, attempt
to run at least four probes on at least four different chromosomes, it is
inaccurate to state that we may find the same genetic profile in 1 person
out of 17 or 1 person in millions. It is also inaccurate to state, in a four
to five probe match, that two people in 34 have that genetic profile or
two people in many millions have the same genetic profile.'97
It also seems correct that each estimate of odds, whether it be minuscule or
phenomenal, misses the point and causes a serious distraction from the truth. "In
no other forensic science are questions asked concerning the 'odds' that someone
else may have deposited the forensic sample or have the genetic characteris-
tic. "198
In criminal cases,
the FBI has not found a four probe match between a defendant and a
random person in over 7.5 million DNA tests performed. The National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences in its report of
1992 entitled "DNA Technology in Forensic Science" [notes] that it
would be an extremely rare event to find two people with the same
genetic profile over three or four chromosomes. Hence, is it appropriate
to tell the jury the odds of a match when we know that information is
not true? Do we do it in serology? fingerprinting? ballistics? paternity?
Hair comparisons? .... .'
The negative odds offered in a DNA case are clearly distinguishable from
the percentages offered in, for instance, paternity. When a percentage is offered
in a paternity case, the opinion states that the person is the father and there is,
for example, a 99.9% probability of that fact. The opinion is directlf'r'elated to
the issue to be determined. The opinion does not offer the odds of anyone else
being the father, although this would be possible as the basis of the opinion is
statistical probabilities derived from databases.
Judge Sheindlin's acerbic statement of doubt that
(i]n fingerprinting, the opinion might use the statistician's language and
state that the chances of anyone else leaving that print other than the
defendant is I in 200 million, as there are only approximately 200
million fingerprints on file. Does that mean two people out of 400
million have the same prints?20°
is well taken!
197. Sheindlin, supra note 149.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Judge Sheindlin is correct in stating that the issue presented is the connection
between the disputed genetic material and the defendant's genetic makeup. Is
it powerfully similar or is it merely similar or does it exclude the accused
defendant or the alleged father? He asks whether the answer of one in several
million or billion or trillion really addresses the relevant question. "Does not this
type of approach smack of the answer that I am less than one mile high or more
than one inch high? Whether the odds are enormously high or unrealistically
low, they are as irrelevant and distracting as the aforementioned estimates of
height.""2 '
Judge Sheindlin raises important issues for paternity and other family law
cases. He suggests, as I have, that the major problem facing our judicial system
and the people it "processes" is related to the significant reality that when we
allow scientists or statisticians to usurp the fact-finding role, we destroy the
value, indeed the pertinence, of the judicial system. He finally states, "now that
we [some of us] have become comfortable with our understanding of this
fascinating science, should we not return to time honored legal method of
presenting expert opinions. .. ? He explains that "DNA profililing is [not]
as clear as supermarket bar codes," and it is not true that "if the tests are not
performed correctly absolutely no result will be obtained." Furthermore, he
explains it is not true that "where tests are performed correctly a perfectly clear
picture is obtained." ' 3 Any such claim would be incorrect, yet courts continue
to make decisions based on expert opinions making such faulty claims. '
Finally, he states, "[i]f DNA tests are not performed properly, you cannot
distinguish one person from another, statistically or otherwise."20 5
4. Washington Supreme Court and Others Hold That the Controversy
Has Ended
The Committee which prepared DNA Technology set out a method for
estimating population frequencies called the ceiling principle. The Washington
Supreme Court held that the methodology underlying RFLP typing is generally
accepted by the scientific community and admissible under Frye.20 It also
held that the statistical evidence of genetic profile frequency probabilities must
be presented to the trier of fact. It approved the ceiling principle (modified, or
201. Id.
202. Id. at n.28.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing People v. Fishback, 829 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), a f'd, 851 P.2d 884
(Colo. 1993) (claiming that DNA testing is "failsafe")); State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1047, 112 S. Ct. 911 (1992) (claiming an accuracy rate is 100%); Andrews
v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (1989).
205. Sheindlin, supra note 149, at n.28.
206. State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304 (Wash. 1996) (en banc).
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"interim," ceiling principle).2 O In September, 1996, the Washington Supreme
Court described the "product" or "multiplication" rule:
Briefly restated, the product rule (or "multiplication rule") as
applied in RFLP typing means that the probability of a genetic profile
occurring in the population is the product of the probabilities of each
individual allele's occurrence in the population. Validity of the rule
depends upon whether the individual alleles are actually statistically
independent. Cauthron, 120 Wash.2d at 901, 846 P.2d 502 (citing
DNA Technology, at 76). Two assumptions underlie use of the product
rule when calculating genetic profile frequencies: linkage equilibrium,
which means that the alleles at different loci are inherited independent
of each other, and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, which means that one
allele at a locus is not predictive of the other allele at that locus (one
allele is inherited from the mother, the other from the father). Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium depends upon an assumption of a large population
in which there is random mating. The Committee reported in 1992 that
substantial controversy arose about the adequacy of population databases
used to calculate frequency estimates and about the role of racial and
ethnic origin in the frequency estimation. Potential problems could
result from "genetic drift" resulting in small populations having distinct
genetic differences, too small a database, lack of randomness of the
samples, and most importantly, lack of a truly mixed population such
that each locus is in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium as well as linkage
equilibrium.2aO
The "raging debate," noted earlier, has perhaps come to rest. The Supreme
Court of Washington reports that it has. It notes that "some scientific literature
supported the view that there were statistically significant deviations from Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium, indicating the presence of genetically distinct subgroups
in Caucasian, black, and Hispanic groups."2°  "However, other literature
disputed early conclusions that the possibility of substructuring in major
population groups was statistically significant."2 '
As we have noted, a number of courts have concluded that in light of the
scientific disagreement there was a lack of general acceptance of use of the
207. Id. For more on the "ceiling principle," see supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text,
State v. Jones, 922 P.2d 806 (Wash. 1996) (en banc). However, while the Copeland court approved
the ceiling principle, it has not foreclosed use of other statistical models provided they are accepted
in the scientific community. State v. Buckner, 890 P.2d 460 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
208. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1317 (some citations omitted).
209. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1317 (citing State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993) (citing,
among others, Lewontin & Hart, supra note 159, at 1747)).
210. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1317 (citing, e.g., Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 159).
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product rule to estimate genetic profile frequencies and, accordingly, such
calculations were not admissible."'
The Washington Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision that use of the
product rule for this purpose was not generally accepted because of concerns that
substructuring in human populations undercut certain assumptions underlying use
of the rule. The Washington court noted that its decision was "heavily
influenced by recognition of the Committee that there was a significant dispute
among the scientists.""2 It held that the evidence today, the literature, and the
case law from other jurisdictions shows that use of the product rule now has
sufficient general acceptance that it is admissible under Fry "3 for calculating
statistical frequencies of genetic profiles from RFLP typing results.
State's experts at the Frye hearing in this case included Dr. Bruce Weir, a
professor of mathematics, statistics and genetics, Dr. Ranajit Chakraborty, a
preeminent expert in statistics and human genetics, with over twenty years of
study involving human DNA and genetics, Dr. Richard Gelinas, a molecular
biologist, and Dr. Ellen Wijsman, a population geneticist. State's experts did not
dispute that substructuring exists, but concluded it is statistically insignificant
because empirical studies have shown the databases were nonetheless sufficiently
in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and linkage equilibrium so that substructuring did
not improperly affect calculations using the product rule.
Defense experts, Dr. Laurence Mueller, a population geneticist, and Dr.
Seymour Geisser, a statistician, disputed these conclusions. The Washington
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err when it found, that "this
process of multiplication, known as the 'product rule,' is valid if each band (or
bin) is independent of the others. That the frequencies of independent events
may be multiplied to determine the frequency of their simultaneous occurrence
is a universally accepted principle of statistics." It held that:
Although various experts have raised theoretical objections to the use
of the product rule with RFLP data, those experts who have analyzed
the data agree that there is no evidence of dependence between the
alleles, defined as fixed bins, used by the FBI. Indeed, the testimony,
published work, and analysis performed in this case by Ranajit
Chakraborty, Bruce Weir, and Ellen Wijsman prove that independence
between alleles defined as fixed bins is a valid assumption. The
defense presented no evidence that the assumption of independence was
invalid. (Dr. Mueller's testimony was neither persuasive nor credible.)
Our review is de novo and we are do not defer [sic] to the trial court's
finding that the product rule is generally accepted. However, we have
211. State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993).
212. Copeland. 922 P.2d at 1317.
213. Washington continues to apply the Frye standard, discussed below. Copeland, 922 P.2d
at 1317.
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extensively reviewed the Frye hearing in this case, and we reach the
same conclusion as the trial court did.
Although at one time a significant dispute existed among qualified
scientists, from the present vantage point we are able to say that the
significant dispute was short-lived. Cauthron was decided while the
dispute raged; since that time additional empirical studies have been
conducted, the FBI has collected data from around the world, and one
of the most vociferous opponents of use of the product rule has joined
with an FBI scientist in declaring that the DNA wars are over.214
The Washington Supreme Court accepted this, based in part on the fact that
the FBI had conducted a world-wide study of VNTR frequency data from around
the world."' The study concluded:
1) that there are sufficient population data available to determine
whether or not forensically significant differences might occur when
using different population databases; 2) that subdivision, eitherby ethnic
group or by U.S. geographic region, within a major population group
does not substantially affect forensic estimates of the likelihood of
occurrence of a DNA profile; 3) that estimates of the likelihood of
occurrence of a DNA profile using major population group databases
(e.g., Caucasian, Black, and Hispanic) provide a greater range of
frequencies than would estimates from subgroups of a major population
category; therefore, the estimate of the likelihood of occurrence of a
DNA profile derived by the current practice of employing the multipli-
214. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1318.
215. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1318 (citing United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, ]-A VNTR Population Data: A Worldwide Study (Feb. 1993) (a 5 volume study)
(hereinafter Worldwide Study]). The Hartl-Lowontin concerns rested on an assumption that
intermarriage had a genetic effect on VNTR markers. VNTR is the abbreviation for "variable number
of tandem repeats." This is a description of those sites selected for comparison because of the ease
with which they are located; when the same pattern of two or three of the four possible bases is
repeated a multitude of times forming a long chain, it is easily detected. Several courts have now
held that the FBI's Worldwide Study appears to have established the opposite. See, e.g., Copeland,
922 P.2d at 1318; People v. Dalcollo, 669 N.E.2d 378, 388 (Il1. App. Ct. 1996); People v. Pope, No.
4-95-0021, 1996 WI. 663358 (111. App. 1996); People v. Smith, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); cf Armstead v. Maryland, 673 A.2d 221 (Md. 1996); Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281, 289
(Colo. 1995); People v. Chandler, 536 N.W.2d 799 (Mich. 1995). Specifically, the study found, inter
alia, that (i) subdivisions in a major population group do not substantially affect forensic estimates
of the liklihood of a DNA profile; and (2) estimates of the likelihood of occurrence of a DNA profile
using major population group databases (e.g., Caucasian, Black, and Hispanic) provide a greater range
of frequencies than would estimates for subgroups of a major population category. Worldwide Study,
at 2. Based on these findings, the study concluded that the estimate of the likelihood of occurrence
of a DNA profile derived by the current practice of employing the product rule and using general
population databases is reliable, valid, and meaningful, without forensically significant consequences.
Worldwide Study, at 2, cited in Lindsey, 892 P.2d at 294. Some courts have held that this study
resolves the "bitter debate"-if ever there was one.
[Vol. 57
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
cation rule and using general population databases for allele frequencies
is reliable, valid, and meaningful, without forensically significant
consequences; and 4) that the data do not support the need for alternate
procedures, such as the ceiling principle approach....
In fact, a former opponent of use of the product rule has changed position.
In 1994, Dr. Eric Lander co-authored an article with Bruce Budowle, declaring,
"[t]he great DNA fingerprinting controversy over.""2 7 Lander and Budowle
approved use of the Committee's ceiling principle, calling it "unabashedly
conservative.... 2' These scholars stated: "[s]ome of the statistical power
was sacrificed to neutralize all possible worries about population substruc-
ture. 1219
These scholars also wrote, however, that the Committee's report "failed to
state clearly enough that the ceiling principle was intended as an ultra-conserva-
tive calculation, which did not bar experts from providing their own 'best
estimates' based on the product rule."'  They noted that the FBI's population
surveys "yielded a remarkable database for examining allele frequency variation
among ethnic groups. Reassuringly, the observed variation is modest for the loci
used in forensic analysis and random matches are quite rare, supporting the
notion that the FBI's implementation of the product rule is a reasonable best
estimate. ''22
In addition to the Washington Supreme Court, other courts have begun to
take notice of the FBI's worldwide study, the numerous empirical studies
reported, and the Lander and Budowle article, and have recognized, as the
Copeland court did, that the significant challenges to use of the product rule have
216. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1318-19 (considering FBI's Worldwide Study). The Court also noted
that other studies have similarly concluded that differences of allelic distribution is not forensically
significant. E.g., qruce Budowle et al., The Assessment of Frequency Estimates of Hae Ill-Generated
VNTR Profiles in Various Reference Databases, 39 J. of Forensic Sciences 319 (Jan. 1994); Bruce
Budowle et al., Evaluation of Hinf l-Generated VNTR Profile Frequencies Determined Using Various
Ethnic Databases, 39 J. of Forensic Sciences 988 (July 1994); Shui Tse Chow et al., The
Development of DNA Profiling Database in an HAE III Based RFLP System for Chinese. Malays,
and Indians in Singapore, 38 J. of Forensic Sciences 874 (July 1993). Also, extensive literature in
peer-reviewed journals indicates that substructuring does not have much impact on DNA population
frequency estimates. See People v. Marlow, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (citing a
number of articles, including several submitted as exhibits in Copeland's Frye hearing), review
granted, 899 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1995) (California rules provide that once review is granted, an opinion
may not be cited as legal authority).
217. Lander & Budowle, supra note 182. Dr. Lander's opinions were extensively relied upon
by the Cauthron court.
218. Lander & Budowle, supra note 182, at 736.
219. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1319 (citing Lander & Budowle, supra note 182, at 735).
220. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1319 (quoting Lander & Budowle, supra note 182, at 737. Dr.
Lander was a member of the Committee and Dr. Budowle is the F.B.I.'s Program Manager for DNA
research. They were both primary architects in the development of forensic DNA use.).
221. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1319 (citing Lander & Budowle, supra note 182, at 738).
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been sufficiently resolved.' Unanimity, of course, does not exist on this point
and controversy has not been eliminated. The Washington Supreme Court held
that it does not require unanimity among scientists before finding general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community. The Washington Supreme Court
thus held that "use of the product rule in establishing statistical probabilities of
a genetic profile frequency in the human population is generally accepted within
the relevant scientific community and that a significant dispute no longer exists
on this matter."' m It did this, however, in the context of reaffirming the Frye
standard, which is no longer the rule in Louisiana.224
L. Evidence-the Need for Corroboration: May or Should Scientific Testing
Be the Sole Factor in Determining Paternity?
The discussion so far suggests that although scientific testing, especially
DNA and related tests, are more reliable than earlier blood tests, it is neverthe-
less challengeable and ought to be well-corroborated. Professor James Starrs was
quoted by the Washington Post: "I don't know of any other instance in forensics
where the jury [or other trier of fact] is just overwhelmed with a visual and
pictorial presentation.22s Louisiana law traditionally has mandated that DNA
or other scientific testing may not be the sole factor in determining paternity.
The tests have been considered to be but one factor to be weighed by the trier
of fact against the totality of the circumstances, including sexual access and the
credibility of witnesses.26
M Traditionally, Louisiana Jurisprudence Has Required Corroboration
Is it constitutional, proper, or wise to establish paternity by presumption
based on scientific testing, as in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.3(B)(I)(b) or
the federal rule in 42 U.S.C. 666(a)(5)? Although scientific testing clearly ought
to be utilized and admitted in court, serious doubt exists as to whether "any ex-
pert-no matter how skilled in biochemistry or biostatistics--can correctly testify
222. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1319 (citing, e.g., Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281 (Colo. 1995);
Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221 (Md. 1996); People v. Chandler, 536 N.W.2d 799 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995)).
223. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1319.
224. Louisiana applies the Daubert test, which is analyzed below.
225. James E. Starts, quoted in Naftali Bendavid, DNA: What the Code Won't Unlock: In the
Search for Evidence, Our Faith in Science Can Lead Us Astray, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1994, at C3,
and in Jennifer Sue Deck. Note, Prelude to a Miss: A Cautionary Note Against Expanding DNA
.Databanks in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 1057, 1090 (1996).
226. State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dorsey, 665 So. 2d 95, 96 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995); State
v. Simien, 677 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Didier v. Fasola, 597 So. 2d 450, 454 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 661 (1992); State ex rel. Gray v. Hogan, 613 So. 2d 681, 683
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1993); State v. Montgomery, 574 So. 2d 1297, 1301 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 577 So. 2d 38 (1991).
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to any quantified probability that the defendant in a given case is in fact the
father." 7 So, notwithstanding the high degree of confidence placed in the
tests by the scientific community and many courts, applying complicated
statistical evidence in a paternity case poses a serious danger of misleading the
court.
Because of the dangers related to scientific testing, although the testing is
persuasive and often effective, testing or statistical evidence by itself has been
insufficient to prove paternity in Louisiana. 8 Statistical evidence has always
had to be and still should be corroborated. Otherwise, the scientific and
probability evidence may be misleading and may not provide a true picture for
the trier of fact. This is why, in a case in which the evidence as a whole is
unfavorable to the plaintifms case, the fact that the blood or tissue tests show a
high probability that the defendant is the biological father has not been allowed,
without other credible evidence (such as sexual access during the critical period),
to establish paternity by a preponderance of the evidence.229
The need for corroboration stems from several factors, including difficulties
with the gathering, storing, and testing process itself and the extreme difficulty
in presenting the scientific and statistical evidence to the court in a manner that
allows it to be clearly and correctly understood. Its actual value, even its
meaning, must be understood, but often is difficult to understand. Thus, most
jurisdictions traditionally have required corroboration and have allowed the trier
of fact to consider the expert testimony for what they feel it is worth; they may
even discard it entirely. 30
Therefore, the traditional and prudent approach provided that, while
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.3 (both before and after its 1988 amendment)
directed the trial court to dismiss a paternity action if blood tests show that the
defendant is not the father (exclusion may be definitive), the statute provided no
positive direction for cases in which the blood tests "strongly indicate" that he
is the father."' Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal held in 1989, that
227. Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472, 474 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Ira. M. Eliman & David
Kaye. Probabilities and Proof- Can HLA and Blood Grouping Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1131, 1133 (1979).
228. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 497 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1986); State v. Jackson, 583 So. 2d 1240, 1242
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1991); Perkins v. Vega, 554 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559
So. 2d 139 (1990).
229. Suite v. Robison, 511 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
230. South Carolina Dep't of Social Se'vs. v. Bacot, 313 S.E.2d 45 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Plemel
v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209 (Or. 1987): see generally, Annotation, Admissibility, Weight and Sufficiency
of Human Leukocyte Antigen (HA) Tissue Typing Tests in Paternity Cases, 37 A.L.R. 4th 167
(1985); Jackson v. Jackson, 322 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. 1984); Minnesota v. Hagen, 382 N.W.2d 556 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986).
231. Perkins v. Vega, 554 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 139
(1990). Even in criminal cases, loose language is not uncommon. For example, see State v. Every,
678 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 5th Cit. 1996) ("an expert in ... molecular biology and DNA analysis,
testified that a towel seized from the defendant's residence contained blood which 'was consistent
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although an expert testified that the blood tests could not prove paternity beyond
any doubt, but did indicate "a 99.2% chance" that the defendant was the father,
the mother did not meet her burden of persuasion. This is because she did not
produce any other evidence placing the alleged father with her at the time of
conception.
N. Corroborated Scientific Evidence Has Been Sufficient
In 1993, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed that paternity was
proved when scientific testing was corroborated and "not ... an alleged one
night encounter between virtual strangers .... Nor were the test results
unexplained by expert testimony, as respectively portrayed in Perkins v.
Vega,233 and State v. Montgomery." The man whose tissue testing provided
a high indicator that he may be the father also had cohabited with mother during
the crucial time for conception.
0. Louisiana Evidentiary Law and Procedure-Chain of Evidence
The chain of evidence method of identification is a widely recognized
approach in both civil and criminal cases. Louisiana, apparently enamored by
the model act and influenced by the Department of Social Services and the
interest in protecting children and the State coffers, adopted the entirety of the
Uniform Acton Blood Tests. It provides in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.2,
that "[t]he chain of custody of blood or tissue samples ... may be established
by affidavit if verified documentation of the chain of custody is submitted with
the expert's report and if such documentation was made at or near the time of
the chain of custody and was made in the course of regularly conducted business
activity." This has been held to authorize the introduction of blood test results
without the necessity of any personal appearance or live testimony by an
expert 3 This breaks tradition and the import of the chain of custody.
Traditionally and generally in the arena of the chain bf custody of evidence,
with the victim ... and most probably came from her. "" Id.) (emphasis added).
232. Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472, 475 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 624 So. 2d 472
(1994).
233. Perkins v. Vega, 554 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 139
(1990).
234. State v. Montgomery, 574 So. 2d 1297 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 38
(1991). See Litton, 624 So. 2d at 474. See also, generally, State v. Dorsey, 665 So. 2d 95, 96 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1995); State v. Simien, 677 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Didier v. Fasola, 597
So. 2d 450,454 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991); State ex rel. Gray v. Hogan, 613 So. 2d 681, 683 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1993); State v. Montgomery, 574 So. 2d 1297, 1301 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 577 So.
2d 38 (1991).
235. Simien, 677 So. 2d at 1140-41; State ex rti. Garret v. Ashy, 653 So. 2d 20, 24-25 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1995). But cf State cx rel. Johnson v. White, 651 So. 2d 366, 367-69 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1995).
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courts do not allow the identity and authenticity of an exhibit to be established
by a single witness. 36 This is because several people have usually handled the
specimen before, during, and after its analysis.2" Blood and tissue samples or
specimens, of course, should be handled with utmost care. All persons who had
access to the specimen should be ready and able to identify it and to testify to
its custody and unchanged condition when in their custody. Gaps or gaffs in the
chain provide opportunity for attacking the validity of the test results. Many
states, however, hold that the decision as to the chain of custody is a matter
within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned unless there is
clear error or an abuse of discretion.23  Courts, however, now often accept
simply a "reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample." 9 Here follows
an example of trial testimony regarding chain of custody:
* 'T]he blood was drawn by a phlebotomist and not by the
witness testifying. The witness, Dr. Hubbard, testified as follows:
Q. Do your records reflect the dates upon which those tests (DNA)
were conducted, and in whose presence they may have been conducted,
and under what types of conditions and policy?
A. Which would you like for me to answer first? I can explain to you
the normal operating procedure. The blood is drawn in the hospital
laboratory, not by me, it's drawn by a phlebotomist, who are people
who are specifically trained to draw blood. After the blood is drawn,
there are various documents that have to be signed to maintain chain of
possession of the blood. An authorization to do the testing is given by
individuals involved in the case. Their phlebotomy or the blood being
drawn is witnessed, and the witnesses sign as to who they are.
Individuals participating in the case are photographed, identified using
a picture ID usually, or mutual identification. They are fingerprinted
and they are photographed. Once the blood is drawn, the participants,
if they are able, initial the blood tubes, if they are able. I mean if it's
a minor, then one of the guardians initial the blood tubes. Then they
are sealed in a sample-in a tamper evident sample package, it's not
tamper proof. And once the blood samples are sealed in that tamper'
evident bag, along with the documentation, then participants in the test
initial the seal, and then they are taken to my laboratory, and then I, or
236. See, e.g., Shell v. Law, C.A. No. 03A01-9509-CV-00323, 1996 WL 275006 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 24, 1996).
237. See Blakesley, supra note 38.
238. E.g., State v. Brown, 238 A.2d 482 (N.J. Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 242 A.2d 16 (1968);
.Patterson v. State, 160 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. 1968); Shell v. Law, C.A. No. 03A01-9509-CV-00323, 1996
WL 275006 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24. 1996).
239. See State v. Simien. 677 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Patterson v. State, 160
S.E.2d 815 (Ga. 1968); Shell v. Law, C.A. No. 03A01-9509-CV-00323. 1996 WL 275006 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 24, 1996).
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one of my technologists, opens the bag and the tests will proceed from
there.2"
P. Preparation and Use of Experts
Successful litigation often depends on counsel's ability to guide his or her
expert through the difficulties of being an effective witness. Proof of paternity
cases, where testimony about scientific testing is required provides a prime
example."" The expert might be a nobel laureate and still not do well; the key
often is not that the expert be the most qualified or knowledgeable on the
subject, but whether counsel has done the necessary preparation to make him an
effective witness.4 Counsel must prepare the witness to answer (on direct and
cross) in a direct, candid and courteous manner.243 The expert must know the
difference between legal, as opposed to pure scientific, terms: e.g., the
difference between possible and probable or "reasonable scientific certainty."2"
Good cross-examination will exploit use of the wrong term. By the same token,
counsel must be familiar with the scientific terminology.
24s
Q. More Difficulties and Dangers Relating to Scientific Testing and Its Use
in Court
We have seen that a vigorous debate is currently raging over the probity/policy
distinction and the value of statistical evidence in trials2 6 Proponents of broad
240. Shell, 1996 WL 275006, at *7.
241. Guide Your Expert Through the Thicket, 19 Fain. Advoc. 29 (1996).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. Even the letter counsel sends to engage the expert may be discovered, so it must be
written appropriately. It should advise the expert what will be required and provide the judge with
insight into what counsel is requesting. Id.
246. See, e.g., Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Review-Essays: Reference Manual on
Science Evidence, Reference Guide on Statistics: Non-Lasciare Esperanza, 36 Jurimetrics J. 201
(1996); Joe S. Cecil, Response: Limitations and Potential of the Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence, 36 Jurimetrics J. 225 (1996); David E. Bernstien, Abstract: Junk Science in the United
States and the Commonwealth, 21 Yale J. Int'l L. 123 (1996); Book Note: Legal Fact. Science
Fiction? [review o/] Science at the Bar. 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1821 (1996); Peter J. Cohen, How Shall
They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 Pace
L. Rev. 237 (1996); Imwinkelried, supra note 48; Aitken, supra note 157, at 61; Edward J.
Imnwinkelried, The Daubert Decision on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The Supreme Court
Chooses the Right Piece for All the Evidentiary Puzzles, 9 St. Johns J. Legal Comment 5 (1993)
[hereinafter Daubert Decision); Edward J. lmwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's
Approach to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 267 (1993)
[hereinafter BriefDefense]; Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence (2d ed.
1993 and Supp. 1996); John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping: The
Federal Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1183
(1996); G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its
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use of statistical evidence admit that "[s]ome evidence-including some types of
statistical or probabilistic evidence-is and should be withheld from juries for
policy reasons unrelated to accurate fact finding."2 7
Even if understood by counsel, statistical evidence ought to be used, but it
must be presented in a manner that allows the decision-maker to understand its
actual probative value. Otherwise it will actually be misleading. Decision-
makers may not be able to translate all the relevant evidence into meaningful
numerical terms:
Computational complexity is only one aspect of what may often be the
prohibitive difficulty of applying rules of mathematical logic in the
courtroom. A more fundamental problem is that fact-finders are likely
to experience difficulty in translating all relevant evidence into
numerical terms. Since few people are accustomed to statistical ways
of thinking and reasoning, there is a danger that one's opinions and
judgments may be altered when they are restated numerically.
A related problem is that some of the probabilities needed to
perform particular mathematical operations may be unavailable or
difficult to specify.2"
Louisiana appears to be enamored with the elimination of the right to
effective cross-examination of principals. Notwithstanding the significant
problems and dangers surrounding scientific testing and its use in court,
Louisiana decisions have recently held that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396, et
seq. authorize the introduction of blood test results without the necessity of the
personal and live testimony of an expert. '"9 The Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal held, for example, that the laboratory report of paternity established
Progeny, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 939 (1996); Kesam, supra note 20; Daniel N. Shaviro. Statistical.
Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 530 (1989); Ronald J. Allen,
On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A Clarification of the "Naked
Statistical Evidence" Debate, the Meaning of "Evidence. " and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1093 (1991); Craig R. Callen. Cognitive Science and the
"Sufficiency ofthe Evidence" Tests, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1113 (1991); Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and
the Appearance of Statistical Evidence. 65 Tul. L. Rev. 457 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, A Response to
Professor Callen, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 499 (1991); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Probity/Policy Distinction
in the Statistical Evidence Debate. 66 Tul. L. Rev. 141 (1991); Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N.
Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic
Evidence and Methods, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 247 (1990); Charles N. LeRay, Note, Implications of DNA
Technology on Posthumous Paternity Determination: Deciding the Facts When Daddy Can't Give
His Opinion, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 747 (1994).
247. Koehler, supra note 246.
248. Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 246, at 275-76.
249. La. R.S. 9:397.3 (1991 and Supp. 1996); for more detail, see supra notes 69-77 and
accompanying text; State v. Simien, 677 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); State ex rel. Braden
v. Nash, 550 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); State ex rel. Bankston v. Davis, 521 So. 2d 575
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
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by blood testing was sufficient to establish paternity, without live appearance by
the gatherers or testers of the evidence.50 The Court provided, however, that
Louisiana law grants access to the report to allow defendant an indication of
whom to subpoena or depose."' Apparently, counsel notified the trial court
that he would object to the testing procedure and, during the trial, did enter his
objection, but proffered no testimony or evidence as to any possible errors.
Counsel certainly should request appearance of the principals for cross
examination and this should be allowed.
In the first circuit decision, the test results at issue simply contained a
"certification by the phlebotomist who drew and packaged the blood samples and
the witness who observed the withdrawal of blood."2 '  The results also
contained the "certification by the individual who received the blood samples for
[the testing laboratory] ... [and] the test results include[d] an affidavit by the
.. laboratory director ... certifying the samples were under his care, custody,
and control, that the testing was in accordance with medically accepted
procedures, that the results [were] correct as reported, and that the documentation
of the chain of custody was made at or near the time of the chain of custody, in
the course of regular business activities."2 3
The court may have allowed defendant to call any of these individuals to be
cross-examined, if he were able to establish a valid reason to do so. That need
would seem always to be self-evident. It is shocking that possibly self-serving
affidavits from the testing facility are allowed to stand as sufficient, without
cross-examination of the principals." The person who has verified the quality
control methods of the laboratory should appear personally, but that alone is not
sufficient. It would seem difficult to establish errors in the process without the
opportunity to cross-examine those who performed the various parts of the
process.
Louisiana courts have also held that even if the overseeing expert actually
testifies, he need not be the actual person who drew the blood or took the tissue
sample, stored it, shipped it, performed the tests, or compiled the statistics for
comparison.2"' The witness may rely on the data compiled by other techni-
cians. Where the record contains affidavits indicating an unbroken chain of
custody of the ... specimens from the moment they were drawn and sealed to
the moment they were opened for testing ... [which are] signed, dated, and
clocked. . ." it is sufficient.256 "All that is required is that the technicians do
250. McKenzie v. Thomas, 678 So. 2d 42 (La. App. I st Cir. 1996).
251. Id. at 45 (citing State ex rel. Triche v. Stewart, 570 So. 2d 182, 184 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1990)).
252. McKenzie, 678 So. 2d at 45 (emphasis added).
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. It is not clear that counsel requested to have the principles appear to be questioned.
255. See La. Code Evid. art. 703; State ex rel. Braden v. Nash, 550 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1989); State v. Simien, 677 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
256. Simien, 677 So. 2d at 1142 (emphasis added).
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the work under the supervision of the certifyng expert, provided that it is demon-
strated at trial that the blood samples have not been adulterated or tampered
with."'S
7
Yet in most litigation, courts are careful to ensure the right to cross examine:
"[tlhe importance to any litigant of cross-examination of a crucial expert witness
cannot be overstated."' 28
It should be an absolute requirement that counsel challenging the results be
allowed to determine whether there had been contamination or other problem in the
testing process. How can this be done without the opportunity to cross-examine a
live person who actually participated in or actually oversaw the process? In the
Simlen case, the expert who testified (and the court held that one need not even
testify) had merely reviewed the data which was developed from the testing. This
Is not consistent with Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:397.3(A). To be fair and
accurate, an expert must be required to appear. Moreover, this expert must be one
who was actually involved in or supervised the process of testing, etc., not merely
one who supervised the writing of the report.,59
R. The Revered Position of Science-Curse or Blessing?
1. What Does the Statistical Evidence Really Mean?
Science is given such a revered position on our society that its theories and
even its exponent opinions are often viewed by society as truth. This reverence
creates the risk of according expert scientific opinion more weight than it deserves
in the overall legal equation to be drawn. Often a court will believe that the 97% or
99.5% figure given by the expert indicates the actual probability of paternity of this
man in this case. It may be that this is a probability of paternity. On the other hand,
the percentage may not be that the person before the bench, not excluded by the
test, is the father. Rather, it is merely a probability of exclusion or the probability
that a man selected at random from the relevant population would be excluded by
the test.2" This is far from being the probability that this man is actually the
father, although the court, unless caused not to do so, may take it as such.26'
It is up to the counsel to be sure that the court is not misled by the evidence.
Professors Ellman and Kaye and many others suggest that it is possible to utilize
a modified chart method to present to the trier of fact the statistical and mathemati-
257. Simien, 677 So. 2d at 1142 (emphasis added). See also Mills v. Mills, 626 So. 2d 1230
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); State ex rel. Crawford v. Gibson. 611 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
258. Rowe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 718, 724 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1996) (citing Linda S. Simard & William 0. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper: The Role of the District
Judge In Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 1457 (1994).
259. SimIen, 677. So. 2d at 1144 (dissent).
260. ElIman & Kaye, supra note 227, at 1141-43.
261. Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 46, at 343.
1997]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cal evidence in a manner that will help them not t6 be confused about the
probability that the man before the court is the father. 262
The court will have to rely upon the skill of counsel to clarify the appropriate
impact of the evidence. The currently utilized method for doing this is properly
called the paternity index.263 The paternity index is generally utilized in the
application of the so-called Bayes' Theorem, which allows calculation of how
"blood and tissue typing tests will change a prior probability of paternity based
upon evidence other than blood tests." ' " In a Louisiana case, an expert testified
that on the basis of HLA testing the "probability of paternity was 99.91%.126s
This, despite the fact that there was corroborated evidence that the defendant had
had a vasectomy, that his sperm count was negative, and that he could not have had
intercourse with the plaintiff on at least one of the occasions on which she alleged
that they were together.266
Professor Koehler makes the point:
Consider a paternity suit that includes the following evidence: (1) A
forensic scientist testifies that blood tests indicate that the defendant is
among the 1% of the population [what population] who could have
fathered a particular child (i.e., who have the blood-based characteristics
that would have gone to the child]; (2) A physician testifies that the
defendant had a vasectomy prior to conception and therefore could not be
the father. Although both testimonies are probative (but in opposite
directions), neither is definitive. The blood test's failure to exclude the
defendant may have arisen by chance [and the population could have been
enormous], and the physician may have been mistaken about the date (or
success) of the vasectomy. Indeed, wherever a chance of error, mistake,
or deceit exists, no item of evidence is probatively definitive.... A
determination of relative probity hinges on one's subjective judgements
about issues such as the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of
the procedures described. '67
Although there has been strident criticism of the Bayes Theorem, its
application in paternity testing, when applied with caution, is often accepted. 2"
262. Ellman & Kaye, supra note 227, at 1152-58.
263. Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 46, at 343-44; Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Rules 760-68 (1988).
264. Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 46, at 343-44.
265. O'Bannon v. Azar, 435 So. 2d 1144 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 441 So. 2d 749 (1983).
266. O'Bannon, 435 So. 2d at 1146-47 (court viewing blood test evidence in conjunction with
all other evidence and holding paternity was not established); Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 46, at
345.
267. Koehler, supra note 246, at 1436.
268. Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 46, at 344; Lea Brilmayer and Lewis Kornhauser, Review:
Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 116, 135 (1978); see also Lawrence
H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329,
1358 (1971) (focusing on use in criminal cases).
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It remains to be seen whether many trial counsel will be comfortable enough with
the advancing technology to succeed in understanding it themselves, much less in
communicating an accurate understanding to the trier of fact.
With these improvements and care taken to present the statistical evidence
along with other evidence, and critical scrutiny of the testing procedures, the use
of scientific testing holds significant potential for identification purposes and ought
not to be rejected, but must be placed in the context of other evidence and presented
in a manner that will allow the trier of fact to understand its relevance and probative
value in the given case.
2. Some Approaches in Other States
Many jurisdictions have considered the problems relating to the evaluation and
impact of mathematical and statistical evidence relating to paternity. The general
rule appears to be that HLA test results, properly authenticated and supported by
other evidence, are admissible as evidence of paternity, but are not conclusive.
The majority of these jurisdictions seems to allow the trier of fact to consider
the expert testimony for what they feel it is worth, and they may discard it
entirely.2s6 In Minnesota v. Hagen, for example, the putative father admitted
having sex with the mother, but asserted it was not during the critical time of
conception. The court held the probability evidence was insufficient. The HLA
tests showed a "likelihood" of 99.62% that the man was the father.
A Minnesota Court of Appeal found that "[a] blood test is only one factor to
be considered and weighed by a jury in determining paternity.... The jury, here,
obviously believed that Hagen did not have access [to the mother] during the time
of conception. This is a credibility determination. Credibility determinations are
for the finder of fact and should not be disturbed on appeal." 70
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that statistical evidence could be
ignored when the evidence was adduced that the mother had engaged in sex with
other men during the conception period."' It thus reversed and reinstated the
original verdict, finding that the appellate decisions had invaded the province of the
jury in discounting the credibility of the testimony. It also found that the court had
placed too much emphasis on the HLA test results in light of the jury's finding that
the defendant's witnesses were credible.
3. Protection Against Abusive Claims
The Iowa Supreme Court held that a trial court abused its discretion in
sanctioning the state welfare agency for failing to investigate sufficiently prior
269. Minnesota v. Hagen, 382 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. App. 1986); Jackson v. Jackson, 322 S.E.2d
725 (Ga. 1984).
270. Hagen, 382 N.W.2d at 559 (citations omitted).
271. Smith v. Shaffer, 515 A.2d 527 (Pa. 1986).
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to a paternity action. When blood tests proved that the alleged father could not
possibly have been the father of the child, the trial court ordered the agency to
pay part of the man's attorney's fees pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
80(a) (similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11), which allows sanctions
against a party or attorney who did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the
facts of the case before filing a complaint. The Iowa Supreme Court held that
the agency may accept the woman's word that she had had sexual intercourse
with the defendant several times and only once with another man, and could
bring the paternity action. Iowa law does not require corroboration of the
mother's testimony."'
II. DAUBERT AND ITS PROGENY
A. Admissibility of DNA Evidence in Paternity Actions
If the alleged father's DNA matches that of the child, the scientist calculates
the likelihood that DNA from a randomly chosen person of the same race might
also match. 7 '
Where the paternity expert testifies that an accurate protocol was followed
in processing the evidence, the trial court should admit the expert's report.2 74
1. The Frye Standard
Prior to Daubert, and still in some states, courts would admit DNA or other
"novel" scientific evidence, if the scientific technique has gained general
acceptance in the pertinent scientific community. This is the so-called Frye
standard, posited by the D.C. Circuit in 1923, in United States v. Frye.25
272. Iowa ex rel. Carrigan v. Duckert, 465 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa 1991).
273. See United States v. Porter, Calm. No. F06277-89, 1991 WL 319015 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept.
20, 1991); District of Columbia ex rel. J.A.B. v. W.R., Civ. A. No. DR-2792:89P, 1991 WL 214204
(D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1991); Minnesota v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); Byne, supra
note 64.
274. Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472, 475 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 624 So. 2d 472
(1994); cf State v. Simien, 677 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); State ex rel. Braden v. Nash,
550 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989). But see discussion supra notes 235-259, Simien, 677 So.
2d at 1144 (dissent).
275. United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (finding polygraph testing
inadmissible). For thorough analysis of the Frye standard, see Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. U.S., A Half-Century Later, 80 Columb. L. Rev. 1197 (1980).
See also United States v. Jacobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 834, 113 S.
Ct. 104 (1992) (adopting a relevancy test), superceded by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). See United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573 (10th Cir.
1994) (noting that Jacobetz is overturned in relation to the sentencing guidelines, but not in relation
to the impact of DNA testing). The Frye and relevancy standards are considered at infra notes 294-
298 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., other cases using the Frye standard, State v. Freeman,
No. A-95-1027, 1996 WL 608328 at *16 (Neb. App. 1996).
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The above discussion illustrates the Frye standard. Some courts have found
that the process of DNA analysis is not only generally admissible but when
properly performed and analyzed, it also appears to be universally admissible, by
both federal and state courts alike applying either the Frye standard, the Frye-
plus standard, or what some call the relevancy approach. " 6 Others find to the
contrary.2"
Some jurisdictions apply what is called the Frye-plus test which requires
every aspect of the testing process to be accepted: (1) the theory; (2) the testing
processes and procedures utilized; and (3) that the testing was properly
performed in the instant situation.
278
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training dr education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise. . . ." Louisiana Evidence Code article 702 is virtually identical.
The United States Supreme Court, in the 1993 decision of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,279 thrust trial courts into the rigorous
position of gatekeeper for proffers of scientific evidence. Courts are the screeners
of the validity of scientific evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.280
The Louisiana Supreme Court embraced Daubert in 1994, in State v. Foret.
28
'
276. See. e.g., United States v. Jacobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
834, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); State v. Lyons, 924 P.2d 802, 811 (Or. 1996); State v. Anderson, 881
P.2d 29, 45 (N.M. 1994) (almost universally accepted); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 503 (Wash.
1993); cf Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395, 400 (Pa. 1994) (scientists almost certain to agree
on whether DNA samples match or do not match--do not agree on proper impact of this). But see
State v. Freeman, No. A-95-1027, 1996 WL 608328, at " 17 (Neb. App. 1996) (no general acceptance
given the substantial disagreement in the scientific community).
277. E.g., State v. Freeman, No. A-95-1027. 1996 WL 608328 (Neb. App. 1996).
278. E.g., New York v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Ex Parte Perry, 586 So.
2d 242 (Ala. 1991); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990), discussed in Byne,
supra note 64, at 3001.
279. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
Some recent articles on the subject include: Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Daubert and the
Reference Manual: An Essay on the Future of Science in Law, 82 Va. L. Rev. 837, 838 (1996)
(suggesting that the significance of Daubert goes beyond evidentiary questions, but signals "a new
receptivity to science as a functional component of American jurisprudence"); Aitken, supra note 157,
at 61; Imwinkelried, Daubert Decision, supra note 246; lmwinkelried, Brief Defense, supra note 246;
Giannelli & lmwinkelried, supra note 246; Conley & Peterson, supra note 246; Fenner, supra note
246; Kesan, supra note 20.
280. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579, 113 S. Ct. at 2786.
281. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993) (holding also that it applied retroactively).
See also Young v. Logue, 660 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (admission of "experts' scientific
testimony").
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The Daubert decision recognizes the fundamental truth that science is at its
base a methodology, not a mass of knowledge." ' Courts must now focus on
the scientific methodology utilized to provide the foundation for and verifying
the integrity of the proffer of evidence, rather than simply look at the muster of
scientists who support the evidence; they must scrutinize every stage of the
evidence gathering, storage, and testing process to ensure its integrity. This was
the old rule adopted in the Frye standard which was posited in United States v.
Frye.83
The United States Supreme Court's rule in Daubert was concerned with
determining the admissibility of testimony relating to "novel scientific knowledge
and techniques" and whether an expert's testimony will be helpful to the fact
finder. Many argue that the Daubert criteria should include peer review of the
expert's work, publication, rate of error, and testability.'
It is also argued that the criteria should include the acceptance of the expert,
his theory and methodology by the scientific community.
The Louisiana Evidence Code has gone the way of the federal system and
many other states in adopting the Daubert so-called "helpfulness" test. The
Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Daubert test as controlling under Federal
Evidence Code article 702. Daubert applies to any blood and tissue testing, not
only to DNA testing."'
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Frye standard as
being inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence, but it also held that
scientific evidence must satisfy a reliability test.2 6 Moreover, the Court noted
that unamended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure uses the term
"scientific" and "knowledge" which require, to qualify as such, that "an inference
or assertion ... be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must
be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is
known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific
knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.1287
Apparently a trial court must apply Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) for
admissibility of scientific evidence. This requires the court to assess the validity
282. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
283. United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("general acceptance," relating to
the admissibility of polygraph test results and holding that the polygraph had, "not yet gained [general]
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities"). See generally
Giannelli, supra note 275; see also Sarah Brashears-Macafee, Note, A Test Both Lawyers and Scientists
Can Live With: The Rigorous Five-Prong Test for the Admission of DNA Profiling Evidence Adopted
in United States v. Matthew Sylvester Two Bulls, 71 Neb. L. Rev. 920,923-24 (1992).
284. E.g., Effie S. Chan, Note, The "Brave New World" of Daubert: True Peer Review,
Editorial Peer Review, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 100 (1995).
285. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1123; see also Young v. Logue, 660 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1995) (relating to admission of "experts' scientific testimony').
286. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579, 113 S. Ct. at 2786; Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science, Frye,
Daubert, and the Federal Rules, 29 Crim. L. Bull. 428, 433 (1993).
287. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579, 113 S. Ct. at 2786; Giannelli, supra note 286, at 433.
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of the methodology underlying scientific expert testimony. The Supreme Court
listed several factors to assist the court in this determination, including: (1)
empirical testing; (2) whether a theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication (relevant, but not dispositive); (3) the technique's "known
or potential rate of error"; (4) the "existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation" as an indicia of trustworthiness; and (5)
"general acceptance" as an important criterion, although not dispositive.M
The Daubert Court quoted Weinstein's Evidence, which lists several factors:
(1) the potential error rate in using the technique, (2) the existence and
maintenance of standards governing its use, (3) presence of safeguards in
the characteristics of the technique, (4) analogy to other scientific
techniques whose results are admissible, (5) the extent to which the
technique has been accepted by scientists in the field involved, (6) the
nature and breadth of the inference adduced, (7) the clarity and simplicity
with which the technique can be described and its results explained, (8)
the extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and the jury,
(9) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique, (10)
the probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case,
and (11) the care with which the technique was employed." 9
The impact of Daubert is still unclear. It applies only to federal cases, so states
may, and many will, continue to apply the Frye standard.29 One news account
noted that the new Daubert test "invites judges to be aggressive in screening out ill-
founded or speculative scientific theories."29'
On the other hand, it seems clear that the decision will at least allow evidence,
such as DNA testing evidence, in more readily and allow the attacks upon it to be
based on its value or weight.
3. Some Outstanding Issues
One thing is clear: The Supreme Court answered two significant questions
that it did not expressly address or acknowledge. First, are there cases that defy
the ability of fact finders to understand them?292 Second, even if fact finders
could finally learn enough to deal with a complex mathematical problem, would
the time that it would take for them to do so be more costly than would make
288. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 2797, 113 S. Ct. at 594; Giannelli, supra note 286, at 434.
289. 3 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 702[3] (1992), cited in Daubert, 509
U.S. at 587, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
290. Giannelli, supra note 286, at 435.
291. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Put Judges in Charge of Deciding Reliability of Scientific
Testimony, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1993, at A10.
292. Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 1157, 1158-59
(1994).
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it worth our paying for them to come to grips with it?293 The answer to the
first question is no. The answer to the second is more problematic and depends
on the circumstances, although there must be some, if not many, cases where it
would not be worth it.2
Allied questions arise: Could resources be better used elsewhere? Who
should decide whether they could better be used elsewhere? Where should they
be used? Who decides that? How can fact finders decide which of two
"experts" is correct, without actually understanding what each of the experts
understands? So in each case, the fact finder must become the expert. Under
Section 702 of the Federal Rule of Evidence, the issue is whether the given
"scientific knowledge" is helpful to the fact finder. That, of course, does not say
what "scientific knowledge" is! Does this make the decision simply go back to
the Frye standard that the Court pretended to abrogate? So, Frye lives, although
now in the form of guidelines, rather than rule.295
Professor Ronald Allen has written:
In my opinion, the most regrettable aspect of Daubert is that the Court
seemed quite unaware of the implications of admitting data without a
basis for believing that the data can be understood. By doing so, it
seems to be putting its stamp of approval on undeliberative and
nonrational legal decision making, which I think to be the antithesis of
the law's aspirations. Jurors or judges who cannot understand the
reasoning of a witness can only accept or reject the witness' conclu-
sions, but neither acceptance nor rejection will occur rationally. The
choice will not be made because a fact finder understands the reasoning
and sees either its cogency or its flaws; it will be made for some other
reason. And the set of "some other reasons" is, from the point of view
of the law's aspirations, filled with unsavory characters.29
The proper term to describe the Daubert test would be as a validation or
reliability standard.297 The so-called "relevancy" test [validation or reliability
standard] focuses on the relevancy of the scientific evidence to the ultimate
question [paternity], the qualifications of the scientist testifying, whether the
evidence presented will be more helpful than confusing to the trier of fact, and
whether the possible prejudicial effects of the evidence will be outweighed by
its probative value.2"
293. Id.
.294. Id.
295. Id. at 1158-59, 1169.
296. Id. at 1174-75.
297. lnwinkelried Letter, supra note 188.
298. E.g., Andrews v. Florida, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Spencer v. Virginia,
384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989); Kelley v. Texas, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); United States
v. akobctz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990), aff'd, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), discussed in Byne,
supra note 64.
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Many jurisdictions are moving to the Daubert test, but some continue to
apply one of the earlier tests. Courts today applying any of the tests do not seem
to reject DNA testing as such in a paternity case, although they sometimes do
hold given evidence or given tests to be inadmissible.2" In California, it has
been held that the evidence is inadmissible under the Frye standard.' In
Massachusetts, the court found that the testing laboratory had violated its own
laboratory protocol in rendering their decision based on only one DNA probe,
even though the parties involved were first degree relatives.30'
4. The Latest Louisiana Supreme Court Decision-State v. Quatrevingt
In 1996, the Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated its and the Legislature's
acceptance of Daubert."2 The Louisiana Court reiterated its adoption (in
Foret) of the Daubert standard for admission of scientific evidence. In Daubert,
the United States Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702, rather
than the "general acceptance" standard established by United States v. Frye,"3
controls the admissibility of expert scientific evidence in federal court. Under
this new standard, the trial court is required to act as a "gatekeeper" to "ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but
reliable." ''
The reliability of scientific evidence is to be ensured by a requirement that
there be a "valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition
to admissibility." ' This connection is to be examined in light of a "prelimi-
nary assessment" by the trial court "of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether the reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts at issue."3°6 The Louisiana
Supreme Court held:
In considering whether scientific evidence is reliable, the trial court
should consider the following factors suggested in Daubert:
(1) The "testability" of the expert's theory or technique;
(2) Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication;
(3) The known or potential rate of error; and
299. Byne, supra note 64, at 3002 (citing In re Baby Girl S., 532 NY.S.2d 634 (Surf. Ct. NY
Cty. 1988); J.LK. v. J.J., 445 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (DNA tests admissible per blood
test statutes)).
300. People v. Wilds, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 354 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev. granted, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d
406 (1995); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
301. Massachusetts v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992).
302. State v. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d 197, 203-05 (La. 1996).
303. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
304. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d at 204.
305. Id.
306. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1122 (La. 1993).
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(4) Whether the methodology is generally accepted in the
scientific community. 7
The Court had noted in Foret that its past decisions had already espoused similar
sentiments regarding the admission of scientific evidence. In State v.
Cantanese,3° this Court rejected Frye's "general acceptance" test in the
scientific community as the only test for the admissibility of polygraph results
in criminal trials.
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that scientific evidence should be
admitted in those proceedings whenever the trial court, after balancing the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, determines that
"the evidence is reliable and will aid in a decision."'  The admission of the
evidence was subject to the "discretion of the trial judge."," The Louisiana
Supreme Court reiterated:
As we noted in Foret, Daubert goes further than Cantanese in that
it sets forth clearer guidelines for determining the reliability of scientific
evidence in its consideration of the probative value aspect of the
balancing test set forth in Cantanese. The similarity between La.Code
Evid. art. 702 and its federal counterpart, along with the fact that
Cantanese had already provided similar guidelines for the admission of
scientific evidence, persuaded this Court to adopt Daubert's requirement
that, in order to be admissible under La.Code Evid. art. 702, scientific
evidence must rise to a threshold level of reliability."'
As to application of the Daubert standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court
noted that, with regard to the relevance of DNA testing, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 15:441.1 provides: "Evidence of deoxyribonucleic acid profiles, genetic
markers of the blood, and secretor status of the saliva offered to establish the
identity of the offender of any crime is relevant as proof in conformity with the
Louisiana Code of Evidence. 31 2 It is clear from this provision, stated the
court, "that the Louisiana legislature intended DNA evidence to be admissible
absent a showing that the evidence is unreliable. Thus, the first part of the
Daubert/Foret analysis, the question of relevancy, is satisfied.13 3
Louisiana courts have recognized that DNA typing is sufficiently scientifical-
ly reliable to cross the admissibility threshold.31 4 In addition, both federal and
307. Id.
308. 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979).
309. Quatrevingt. 670 So. 2d at 201, 204.
310. Id. (citing Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1123 (citing Cantanese, 368 So. 2d at 978-79, 983)).
311. 670 So. 2d at 204 (citing Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1123).
312. 670 So. 2d at 204.
313. Id.
314. See State v. Stclly, 645 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994). writ denied, 653 So. 2d 589
(1995); State v. Brossette, 634 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 640 So. 2d 1344 (1994).
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other state courts have found that, in general, DNA profiling is a reliable
technique and is admissible."'
The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with these courts that the principles of
DNA profiling and RFLP analysis are both relevant and reliable and, therefore,
are admissible."'
B. Daubert and "Band Shifting Correction"
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Quatrevingi focused on the troublesome
problem of band shifting. Professor Jon Thames explains that band shifing is
not well understood. "Band shifting results from the movement between lanes
of the gel used for electrophoresis,"' which leads to altered band lengths. A
monomorphic probe should be used to test for band shift." Even if no such
probe is used, however, courts are prone to hold that this relates only to the
weight and not the admissibility of the evidence."" 9
Band shifting can sometimes be caused by differences in the amount of
DNA loaded, particularly when ethidium bromide is used in the gel.320 Before
the restriction endonuclease digestion, the technician would normally measure the
concentration of DNA in each sample, and then digest equal amounts to be run
in each lane.'2' Inaccuracy in the measurement can result in one lane being
overloaded with DNA. This lane will run differently than adjacent lanes loaded
with a "normal" amount of DNA.
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted in Quatrevingt that the defendant had
acknowledged that DNA profiling in general and RFLP analysis were admissible,
but argued that the specific method employed by the testing laboratory to
315. E.g.. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992); Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d
257 (Fla. 1995); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Trimboli v. State,
817 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App. 1991), affid, 826 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Caldwell v. State,
393 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990).
316. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d at 201, 204-05.
317. Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Witness: Forensic Uses of DNA Test 63 (1990).
318. State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d. 407, 420 n.3 (Minn. 1992).
319. Thames, supra note 54 (citing Minnesota v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 47 (1993)).
320. Nakashima, supra note 103 (citing United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 179 (N.D. Ohio
1991), affid, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993); People v. Mehlberg, 618 N.E.2d 1168, 1179, 1183 (111.
App. Ct.), cert. denied, 624 N.E.2d 813 (1993)).
321. Nakashima, supra note 103, at 466 n.99.
DNA concentration can be measured by determining the amount of UV light of 280
nanometer wavelength that is absorbed by a sample. The more UV light is absorbed by
the sample, the greater the concentration of DNA in the sample. This measurement is
inherently inaccurate because UV light absorption can be caused by other contaminants
like proteins. ribonucleic acids and free nucleotides. A more accurate technique is to add
a fluorescent dye that binds to DNA and to measure the amount of sample fluorescence.
Results obtained with the fluorescence technique can still be skewed by sample
contamination.
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"correct" for band shifting was unreliable because there is no scientifically
accepted protocol of how to adjust the bands. The Louisiana Supreme Court
noted in a footnote that the issue of the laboratory's correction for band shifting
appears to have played little or no role in the majority and concurring opinions
of the Court of Appeal.3"
The expert had testified at the admissibility hearing and at trial that band
shifting is a common phenomenon in DNA analysis. He explained that
Lifecodes uses monomorphic probes, a method of correction which allows the
technician to resituate the bands where they would have appeared had they not
shifted. He maintained that this method still allows the laboratory to declare a
match where band shifting has occurred.
Following the trial court's ruling allowing the state to present the expert
scientific testimony, this expert and a forensic scientist expert testified that the
laboratory "had declared a match between the defendant's DNA imprint and the
seminal fluid found on the towel near the victim's leg even though the autorad
showed evidence of band shifting."
32
The first expert testified that the laboratory is the only lab which attempts
to correct for band shifting and still declare a match. He maintained that the
correction procedure was valid, reliable, and has been reviewed by the scientific
community. By the date of the trial, the laboratory had submitted one paper for
publication in The Journal of Forensic Science on the use of monomorphic
probes to correct for band shifting, but the paper had not yet been published and
was undergoing peer review. 2'
The defendant's experts disputed the lab's claims. The first defense expert
testified that there was no way to correct for band shifting and that scientists
generally disregarded such results. He remarked that he was extremely disturbed
that the laboratory independently created a correction factor that was "their own
personal fudge factor that no one else accepts," and noted it had not even been
documented.32 He. observed that without the correction some of the bands in
this case would be outside of laboratory's "match" criterion of 2% deviation.
The other defense expert further informed the jury that no valid methods
existed to correct the bands and that the laboratory expert's claim that the
laboratory's method had been peer reviewed was unfounded.
The defendant cited jurisprudence from other jurisdictions applying the
"general acceptance" or Frye standard as a basis to hold inadmissible DNA
results which have employed correction for band shifting. 2
322. State v. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d 197, 205 n.8 (La. 1996).
323. Id. at 205.
324. Nakashima, supra note 103, at 466 n.99.
325. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d at 197.
326. Id. (citing People v. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Hayes v. State, 660
So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1995), in which the Florida Supreme Court rejected Lifecodes' correction method
for band shifting under the Frye standard, relying in part on the NRC report). *
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In addition, defendant pointed to the findings presented by the National
Research Council in its report on DNA Technology in Forensic Science,3" the
NRC report referred to above which provides an in-depth analysis of the forensic
use of DNA evidence and associated areas, including band shifting.
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that it did not need to rely upon the
conclusions of the report in deciding the assignment of error in the instant case.
Nevertheless, the Report is illustrative of the issue. The NRC directly addresses
the problem of band shifting as follows:
Testing for band shifting is easy, correcting for it is harder. The
best approach is to clean the samples.., and repeat the experiment in
the hope of avoiding band shifting. When that is impossible because
too little sample is available or it fails .... it is possible in principle to
determine the molecular weights of polymorphic fragments in a sample
by comparing them with monomorphic human bands in the same
lane-so called internal molecular weight standards. These monomor-
phic fragments are expected to have undergone the same band shift, so
they should provide an accurate internal ruler for measurement ... .3
The court indicated that the use of internal standards presents serious
difficulties in actual practice, however. It notes:
Accurate size determination requires a number of internal standards. If
band shifting caused all fragments to change their mobility by the same
percentage, one would need only a single monomorphic fragment to
determine the extent of shift. But band shifting appears to be more
complex than that. Different regions of the gel shift by different amounts.
Little has been published on the nature of band shifting, on the
number of monomorphic internal control bands needed for reliable
correction, and on the accuracy and reproducibility of measurements made
with such correction. For the present, several laboratories have decided
against attempting quantitative corrections; samples that lie outside the
match criterion because of apparent band shifting are declared to be
"inconclusive." The committee urges further study of the problems
associated with band shifting. Until testing laboratories have published
adequate studies on the accuracy and reliability of such corrections, we
recommend that they adopt the policy of declaring samples that show
apparent band shifting to be "inconclusive."32 9
Finally, the court noted that under the'Daubert/Foret est, and even under
the more rigid Cantanese test, the expert testimony elicited at the trial showed
327. See NRC Report, supra note 157.
328. Quatrevingt, 570 So. 2d at 197 (citing NRC Report, supra note 157).
329. 570 So. 2d at 206.
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that the practice of using monomorphic probes to correct for band shifting had
not been proven reliable.
The proponent of the evidence, the state, had failed to demonstrate at the
admissibility hearing: (1) the "testability" of the technique; (2) that the technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential
rate of error; and (4) that the methodology is generally accepted in the scientific
community.3
Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "[w]hile the results of DNA
and RFLP analysis are generally admissible in Louisiana so long as the trial
court's 'gatekeeping' function has been performed in accordance with
Daubert/Foret, Lifecodes' use of monomorphic probes to correct for band
shifting was not shown to be reliable in the trial court, and the trial court erred
in admitting the DNA evidence ....",, .
C. Admissibility of Evidence Versus Proffered Expert's Qualifications
There is a distinction between admissibility and the proffered expert's
expertise. Nevertheless, Evidence Code article 702 addresses both.33 This is
virtually identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence article 702 and to the rule in
many other states. DNA evidence has generally been held admissible in paternity
cases. Apparently, no appellate court, to date, has rejected DNA outright in a
paternity case, although some have found given evidence inadmissible.33
Evidence is to be excluded when a laboratory violates its own protocol. 33
The Minnesota Supreme Court, although acknowledging the validity of DNA
printing, refused to admit evidence when the testing laboratory had not published
its population genetics studies. 3"s
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396(A) provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in any civil
action in which paternity is a relevant fact, or in an action desaveu, the
court, upon its own initiative or upon request made by or on behalf of
any person whose blood is involved, may or, upon motion of any party
to the action made at a time so as to not delay the proceedings unduly,
shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to the
drawing of blood samples, including, but not limited to blood and tissue
type, be determined by appropriate testing procedures. If any person
330. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593, 113 S. Ct. 2786,2796-97
(1993).
331. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d at 206.
332. Cf. State v. Lewis, 654 So. 2d 761, 763 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
333. Byne, supra note 64, at 3002 (citing In re Baby Girl S., 532 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Suff. Ct. NY
Cty. 1988); J.L.J. v. J.J., 445 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (DNA tests admissible per blood test
stanites)).
334. E.g., Commonwealth v. Breadmore, 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992); Byne, supra note 64.
335. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
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refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of
paternity against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others
and the interests of justice so require. 36
Thus, Louisiana, like most, if not all, states, accepts blood testing and DNA
matching to prove or disprove paternity. In fact, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas held that since Texas law allows Texas courts
to accept DNA fingerprinting to establish family relationships, that procedure is
also appropriate for establishing or disestablishing the fatherhood of a deceased
insurance policy holder when an alleged child sought to recover as a beneficia-
ry.
337
It went on to hold that the tests were done properly and their results, along
with other evidence adduced at trial, provided clear and convincing evidence that
the decedent was not the biological father of the child born to his ex-wife shortly
after their divorce. In Texas, like in Louisiana, the child was presumed to be the
child of the ex-husband of the mother when the child was born within 300 days
of the termination of the marriage. Under Texas law, the burden is on the party
denying paternity to rebut the presumption of paternity. The presumption may
be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence, The DNA fingerprinting,
along with the additional evidence adduced at trial, was held to have satisfied
this burden.33
Thus, while scientific testing is important and can provide much valuable
evidence relating to important family law issues, it is no panacea. Worse, it
lends itself to becoming a talisman that allows courts to avoid their duty to apply
the law to the facts and to make legal decisions. Although some scientists would
love to do so, and believe that it is appropriate, they should not be allowed to
usurp the role of the judicial system.
0
336. Emphasis added.
337. See Glover v. Texas, 787 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) ("DNA fingerprinting-its
underlying principles, procedure and technology-is a scientific test that is reliable and has gained
acceptance in the scientific community in the particular field in which it belongs."). Id. See also
Tipps v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Tex. 1991), in which DNA "fingerprint-
ing" paternity test results accepted as persuasive to determine whether a deceased federal employee
had fathered a child, who was born to his ex-wife shortly after their divorce, and now seeks to share
in the group life insurance benefits. The Court held that the properly administered tests results and
the other evidence in the case presented clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was not the
father of the child.
338. Tipps v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
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